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Abstract

With the extensive need of the internet, users are usually required to access multiple services on a daily basis, and therefore they may have to maintain a lot of
username/password pairs. Nevertheless, with the growth in the number of service
providers this approach becomes either inefficient if each login should be unique for
each service, or insecure if the same login is used for multiple services. Fortunately,
in a single sign-on (SSO) model, during a given period (eg. one day) a user may
perform just one single sign-on to a trusted third party (TTP), which is trusted by
all the applications he/she needs to access. Later on, each time the user wants to
access an application, he/she will be automatically authenticated by the interaction
between his client and the TTP, without requiring direct involvement from the user.
Our research focuses on formalising the notions of single sign-on (SSO) and
anonymous single sign-on (ASSO). These notions are motivated by the need of
strong security requirements, low trust level in the TTP and anonymity in a single
sign-on system. Then, we construct generic SSO schemes from digital signatures
and prove that our transformations are secure under some assumptions. Our work
can be summarized as follows:
• Motivated by the fact that most existing SSO schemes either fail to satisfy the
security notions or has a high trust level in the TTP, we formalise a security
model of single sign-on (SSO), which not only satisfies strong security notions

v

but also has a low trust level in the TTP. We then propose a generic construction of SSO from nominative signatures, and present a concrete initialisation.
We also provide formal proofs to show that the proposed SSO scheme is secure
according to our new formal model, if the underlying nominative signature is
secure. We note that this is the first study that investigates the link between
SSO and nominative signatures.
• Motivated by anonymity being an essential privacy requirement in certain scenarios, we first formalize a security model of anonymous single-sign on (ASSO).
Subsequently, we present a generic ASSO scheme which is transformed from
group signatures. Formal proofs show that the proposed ASSO is secure under the assumption that the underlying group signature is secure according
to Bellare et al.’s model introduced at CT-RSA 2005. Compared to existing
SSO schemes, our transformation not only implements the user’s anonymity,
but also reduces the trust level in the TTP.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Authentication and Single Sign-on

In distribution systems, most services are just available to a set of selected users. For
example, some online movies are only available to subscribed members. Thus it is
important for service providers to verify the legality of a user. As the most popular
approach, user should submit a username/password pair when he wants to access a
service. Unfortunately, this means anyone who obtains a valid username/password
pair can impersonate another user.
Meanwhile, with the extensive need of the internet, users are usually required to
access multiple services on a daily basis, and therefore they may have to maintain
a lot of username/password pairs. Nevertheless, with the growth in the number
of service providers this approach becomes either inefficient if each login should be
unique for each service, or insecure if the same login is used for multiple services.
In reality, as many as one third of users [61, 63] tend to use the same or similar
passwords to access different services. Moreover, it is also a considerable burden
for service providers if they have to manage credentials for dealing with credential
issuing, updating, revocation, etc.
Fortunately, in a single sign-on (SSO) model, the user can obtain a credential
from a trusted-third party once and then authenticate himself to different service
providers using the same credential. More clearly, in single sign-on, the user performs
1
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a single initial sign-on to an identity provider trusted by all the applications he
wants access. Later on, each time he wants to access an application, he will be
automatically authenticated by his client and the identity provider without requiring
any direct user interaction. Moreover, service providers in SSO need not manage
the increasing number of credentials. Therefore, single sign-on may be a method to
implement secure and efficient users’ authentication to multiple service providers.
Moreover, some SSO systems, such as Microsoft .NET Passport [50, 51] and OpenID
[49], have already used in practical.
In 1988, Steiner et al. [62] proposed one of the earliest single sign-on solutions,
Kerberos, even though they defined it as a network authentication system. However,
Kerberos is not only complex in the process of authentication, but also can not resist
against impersonation attack. After that, some researches like [16, 21, 25, 34, 49,
70, 67] were focused on proposing a secure and efficient SSO system. This means
single sign-on has been studied for a long time.
Anonymity in electronic communication is very important for users in many scenarios, as they may prefer not to provide personal information to service providers.
But their membership of a group or association should be verified. For example,
if a web site or online forum does not support user anonymity, it may be hard to
attract a good number of comments and discussions. The main reason is that users
may be afraid of talking freely to avoid potential problems, as some sensitive topics
may be involved. In addition, anonymity usually can prompt users to do something
about behaving uncharacteristically, abnormally or atypically in real life.

1.2

Goals of the Thesis

Unfortunately, most of existing SSO systems have shortcomings. For example, in
some SSO systems like [24], when the user wants to access a service by using a
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credential, the service provider (SP) has to directly communicate with the trustedthird party (TTP) because SP cannot verify the validity of credential. Another
drawback is that some systems [39, 50, 51] have a single point of failure, as the
TTP is required to be always online. Moreover, SSO scheme proposed in [62] does
not prevent illegal usage of a personal credential, since an illegal user can access
services if he obtains a legal user’s valid credential, because user does not need
another private key when he wants to authenticate himself. Further more, SSO
systems given in [34, 70] require high trust level in the TTP and anonymity is
not implemented. To the best of our knowledge, anonymity in SSO has only been
informally introduced in the scenario of Global System for Mobile communication by
Elmufti et al [25]. In this system, to access each SP a user will use an one-time ID as
a temporary identity to authenticate himself to a TTP (the GSM network operator),
and TTP then forwards users request to the SP. So, the user is anonymous for the
SP as the SP only knows the user’s temporary ID, not his real identity. In this
system, single point of failure may be an issue and users are NOT anonymous to
the TTP.
As mentioned above, there are several researches focusing on single sign-on, but
some flaws should be limitations. Therefore, our goals are to formalise a secure
model of single sign-on (SSO) to overcome all the flaws. In order to implement our
goal, the following digital signatures may be used to build single sign-on.
1. Classical digital signatures have been widely used for authenticating electronic messages. However, sometimes the users do not want their signature being
publicly verifiable. Nominative signatures are not publicly verifiable. Three
parties are involved in nominative signatures: nominator, nominee and verifier. The nominator and nominee jointly generate the signature and only the
nominee can verify it. Moreover, the validity of a nominative signature can
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only be determined with the help of the nominee. Someone else (even the nominator) should not be able to show the validity of the nominative signature to
a verifier. In 1996, Kim et al. [37] proposed the first notion and construction
of a nominative signature. However, it was found that the nominator could
also verify the signature [35]. Then, Huang and Wang [35] proposed a new
convertible nominative scheme. The convertible means that the nominee can
convert a nominative signature to a publicly verifiable one when necessary.
Unfortunately, [33, 64, 66] pointed out that the nominator in Huang-Wang
scheme can generate valid signatures on his own and show the validity of the
signature to anyone without the consent of the nominee. In 2011, Schuldt and
Hanaoka [60] proposed a stronger security model of nominative signatures.
2. Unlike classical digital signature, group signature allow, introduced by Chaumand and Van Heyst [15], signer anonymity. A group signature scheme consists of a group of users, each holding a private signing key that allows a user
to generate a publicly verifiable signature which hides the identity of the signer within the group. The verifier can verify the validity of the signature but
is not able to know who has generated this signature. Moreover, there is a
party called group manager (GM) who can open (trace) a signature to a group
member if there is a dispute. Some models such as [2, 12, 23, 65] can revoke
the group members, where this behavior does not affect the signing ability of
other unrevoked members. With in-depth study, more security requirements
were proposed in [1, 17]. After that, Bellare etc. [5, 6] proposed the formal
definitions of group signatures.

1.3. Contributions

1.3

5

Contributions

In order to achieve our goals, we propose more secure and efficient single sign-on
models to help users accessing multiple services in their daily work. Meanwhile, our
single sign-on model is generic, which means any nominative signatures or group
signatures satisfying appropriate security requirements can be employed in our single
sign-on model.
• In the first part of this work, we aim to formalise the notion of single sign-on
(SSO). This notion is motivated by the need of strong security requirements
and low trust level in the TTP in a single sign-on system. Then, we construct
a generic SSO scheme from nominative signatures and prove that this SSO
is secure in the proposed security model, by assuming that the underlying
nominative signature is secure according to the model introduced by Schuldt
and Hanaoka [60]. This means that we establish a relation between a cryptographic primitive and a security application: nominative signatures are a
sufficient tool to construct SSO with low trust level in the TTP. In addition, a
concrete instantiation of the generic SSO is also presented. More details will
be introduced in Chapter 3.
• In the second part of this work, we aim to formalize the notion of anonymous
single sign-on (ASSO). This notion is motivated by the important need of
anonymity in single sign-on systems. For example, in the scenarios of subscription of online magazines, news, and digital library or digital resource
control in organisations. At the same time, we observe that anonymity has
not been formally studied in SSO and that almost no SSO schemes support
anonymity. Therefore, we are motivated to formally study anonymous single
sign-on (ASSO) in this work by proposing the first formal model and presenting a generic ASSO construction transformed from any group signature
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scheme, which satisfies the security notions proposed in [6]. Formal proofs
are also provided to show that this ASSO is secure according to the proposed
formal definitions. Though the transformation from group signature to ASSO is seemingly straightforward, the novelty of our work is twofold. On the
one hand, our formal model is carefully formalised to capture security requirements in ASSO, in which group signature may not necessarily be the only
implementation tool. On the other hand, our formal security analysis concludes that group signatures (under a proper model) are a sufficiently strong
building block to implement ASSO. In addition, our results also mean that
ASSO forms one more potential application of group signatures, which have
been extensively investigated in literature but lack for real applications, except
a variant technique called direct anonymous attestation (DAA) that has been
employed as the core mechanism in trusted computing [9]. More details will
be introduced in Chapter 4.
Both nominative signature and group signature can be used to build single signon with strong security. However, comparing to the first part, the second part also
can implement the user anonymity. Therefore, we can consider the second part is
the derived form from the first part in the function.

1.4

Organization of the Thesis

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
• In Chapter 2, we briefly describe some background knowledge necessary for the
subsequent chapters. Firstly, we briefly describe some mathematical primitives
used in our research. We then briefly describe some related signature schemes,
for example, the nominative signatures and the group signatures. Finally,
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we briefly describe some useful cryptographic tools, such as hash functions,
bilinear pairings, random oracle model and zero knowledge proofs.
• In Chapter 3, we formalise a security model of single sign-on (SSO), propose
a generic SSO construction from nominative signatures, analyse the security
of the proposed SSO, and present a concrete instantiation.
• In Chapter 4, we first formalize a security model of anonymous single-sign
on (ASSO), propose a generic ASSO construction from nominative signatures,
analyse the security of the proposed ASSO, and present a concrete instantiation.
• Chapter 5 concludes the thesis, and points out the future work.

1.5

Notation

In this section, we briefly provide the general notation used in our thesis. In Table
1.1, we briefly introduce the notation used most in the thesis.

1.5. Notation

Notation
Z
Zq
Z∗q
r ∈R Z∗q
G
g∈G
|S|
A
A(·)
A(·, ·)
ê
ri
a, ..., b
ê : G × G → GT
H
⊕
Pr[a]

y ← A(·)
y←S
PPT
TTP
e

8

Interpretation
the set of integers
an integer group of modulo q
an integer group of modulo q without zero
uniformly pick a element r from group Z at random
a multiplicative cyclic group
a generator of a multiplicative cyclic group
number of element if S is a finite set
an algorithm
an algorithm with one input
an algorithm with two inputs
a bilinear map
the index i of element r
a set of integers from a to b
a bilinear map from ê(g, g) to GT
crypto-hash function
exclusive or
probability of a
a negligible probability
y is the output of algorithm A on one input
y is chosen from set S
probabilistic polynomial time
trusted third party
the base of nature logarithm
Table 1.1: Notation used in the thesis

Chapter 2
Background
The goal of this chapter is to introduce some fundamental knowledge of cryptography which will be used throughout this thesis. Firstly, we review basic concepts of
mathematical primitives. After that we describe some related cryptographic knowledge, such as signature schemes, zero knowledge proofs and security proofs. Finally
we provide some useful cryptographic tools, such as hash functions, bilinear pairings,
random oracle.

2.1

Mathematical Background

In this section, we review some mathematical primitives that will be used in the
following chapters. Further background can be found in [44].

2.1.1

Number Theory

Definition 1 Two integers a and b are said to be relatively prime or coprime if
gcd(a,b) = 1 [44].
gcd denotes the greatest common divisor, which is the largest positive integer that
divides both a and b.
Definition 2 If a and b are integers, then a is said to be congruent with b modulo
n, written a ≡ b (mod n), if n divides (a - b). The integer n is called the modulus

9

2.1. Mathematical Background

10

of the congruence [44].
Definition 3 The integers modulo n, denoted Zn , is the set of integers {0, 1, 2,
..., n-1}. Addition, subtraction, and multiplication over Zn are performed modulo n
[44].
Definition 4 Z∗q is the set of integers {1, 2, ..., q-1}. Addition, subtraction, and
multiplication over Z∗q are performed modulo q [44].

2.1.2

Group Theory

Definition 5 A binary operation ∗ on a set S is a mapping from S × S to S. That
is, ∗ is a rule which assigns to each ordered pair of elements from S an element of
S [44].
Definition 6 A group is a set G together with an associative binary operation ∗
on elements of G such that G contains an identity element for ∗ and every element
has an inverse under ∗. If ∗ is commutative, then the group is called Abelian or
commutative. Often, a group is denoted by hG, ∗i or simply by G. A group G is
called finite if |G| is finite. The number of elements of a finite group is called its
order [44].
Definition 7 A group G is cyclic if there is g ∈ G such that every element a ∈ G
can be written in the form of g k for some k ∈ Z. That is G = {g i | i ≥ 0}. We call
such g is a generator of G and write hgi = G to indicate that g generates G [44].
Definition 8 Let G be a group and a ∈ G. The order of a, denoted by ord(a), is
the smallest positive integer n such that an = 1, provided that such an integer exists.
If such an n does not exist, then the order of a is defined as ∞ [44].
Definition 9 Let hG, ∗i be a group. We say that hH, ∗i is a subgroup of G if G ⊆ G
and hH, ∗i is a group [44].

2.2. Public Key Infrastructure
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Public Key Infrastructure

A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a system that provides authentic public keys
(public keys signed by certification authority) to applications. According to X.509
which is a Telecommunication Standardization Sector standard for public key infrastructure [36], the functions of a PKI include:
- Certification Authority: The Certification Authority (CA) is the core of a
PKI, which issues digital certificates for other parties. It authenticates the
public key of an entity by signing it with its private key. The other parties can
verify the signature and confirm the binding between the public key and its
owner. A certificate revocation mechanism is employed to revoke a certificate
in case of accidental events, such as key compromise or loss. The function of
a Certification Authority include:
1) Issuing certificate for users.
2) Issuing cross certificates for other CAs.
3) Revoking a certificate in case of key compromise or loss.
4) Updating the Key Revocation List (CRL).
- Registration Authority: The Registration Authority (RA) is a component of
a PKI which verifies an entity’s request for a digital certificate and tells the
Certificate Authorities to issue it. The functions of Registration Authority
include:
1) Verifying the identity of an entity.
2) Verifying the possession of the private key.
3) Requesting certificate revocation for a certificate issued by CA.
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- Directory Server: The Directory Server is a component of PKI which stores the
certificates and the CRL list. It could be a system or a collection of distributed
systems. It does not normally need to be trusted. A Directory Server has the
following functions:
1) Holding certificates or CRL.
2) Allowing an entity to download a certificate or CRL.
In large-scale deployments, there could be more than one CA. Each CA has
one or more RAs and can publish data in one or more Directory Servers. In such
a situation, a hierarchy model is usually employed, in which the upper level CA
delegates trust to subordinate CAs. For example, suppose Alice and Bob belong to
different CAs. A trust can be established between Alice and Bob if Bob’s certificate
also includes his CA’s public key signed by Alice’s CA. However, this kind of crosscertification may cause quite long certificate chains.

2.3
2.3.1

Digital Signature Schemes
Basics of Digital Signature Schemes

A digital signature is a cryptographic primitive which provides authentication. It
allows someone to sign a message so that everyone can verify the authenticity of
the signature but no one can forge the signature on a new message. The concept of
digital signatures was first introduced by Diffie and Hellman [22]. Since then many
signature scheme have been proposed, for example, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
proposed a signature scheme based on RSA [58]. The other digital signature schemes
include [40, 46, 56, 59]. A standard digital signature scheme consists of the following
algorithms:
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- Key Generation: It is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a system parameter
` as input, and outputs a public key P K and the corresponding secret key SK
for a signer.
- Sign: It is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a message m ∈ M and a secret
key SK as input, and outputs a signature σ.
- Verify: It is a deterministic algorithm that takes a message m, a signature σ
and public key P K as input, and outputs either Accept or Reject.
A digital signature scheme should meet the following requirements:
1. σ is a valid signature if and only if for all messages m, for all key pairs
(SK, P K) output by Key Generation, it holds that Verify(m, Sign(m, SK),
P K) = Accept.
2. It is computationally infeasible for any entity other than the signer S to find,
for any message m, a signature σ such that Verify(m, σ, P K) = Accept.
Here we use an RSA signature scheme as an example; the algorithms are as
follows [58]:
- Key Generation: On input of a security parameters `, the signer generates n
= pq and ϕ(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) where p = 2p0 + 1, q = 2q 0 + 1 and p, q, p0 ,
q 0 are all primes. It also chooses an integer e such that 1 < e < ϕ(n) and
gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1. Finally it computes the secret key d such that 1 < d < ϕ(n)
and ed ≡ 1(mod ϕ(n)). It publishes (e, n) and keeps d secret.
- Sign: To sign a message m, the signer computes σ = h(m)d (mod n), where h
is a hash function. It sends σ and m to the verifier.
?

- Verify: To verify a signature σ, the verifier checks h(m) = σ e . It outputs
Accept if the above equation holds, and Reject otherwise.
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Attacks and Security Notions for Digital Signatures

Attacks
Usually a digital signature scheme is said to be secure if it is against certain types
of attack. There are two types of attacks in general [30]. Key-Only Attack and
Message Attack. The Key-Only Attack is also referred to as a No-Message Attack
in which the attacker only knows the public key of the signer. The Message Attack
is more severe, because it allows the attacker to access a list of message-signature
pairs. It can be further divided into four subclasses [54]:
• Known Message Attack: Attacker A has access to the signature {σi }i∈[1,n]
for a set of messages {mi }i∈[1,n] with the restriction that he has not chosen any
of the mi .
• Generic Chosen Message Attack: Attacker A has access to the signatures
{σi }i∈[1,n] for a set of messages {mi }i∈[1,n] chosen by him. However, this choice
must be made before accessing the public key of the signer S. Since this attack
is independent of S’s public key, we refer to it as ”generic”. It means attacker
should attack any signer S.
• Directed Chosen Message Attack: Attacker A has access to the signatures
{σi }i∈[1,n] for a set of messages {mi }i∈[1,n] chosen by him. However, this choice
must be made before accessing the public key of the signer S. Since this attack
is against a particular signer S, we refer to it as ”directed chosen message
attack”. It means attacker only need attack a particular signer S.
• Adaptive Chosen Message Attack: Attacker A can choose an arbitrary
message m and request the signature σ from the signer S. We call it ”adaptive”
because attacker A can adapt his queries according to the previously obtained
signatures.
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Forgeries
An attack is said to be successful if the attacker A can forge a valid signature. The
attacks can be classified [55] according to the severity of attack:
• Total Break: This is the most serious attack, in which attacker A can compute the signer S’s secret key.
• Universal Forgery: Attacker A can construct an efficient signing algorithm
functionally equivalent to S’s signing algorithm.
• Existential Forgery: Attacker A can forge a valid signature-message pair.
This kind of forgery does not allow the attacker control over the message the
valid signature-message pair is generated for. This kind of attack is usually
considered to be least severe.

Security Requirements
The notion of Existential Unforgeability Against Chosen Message Attack for digital signatures was first introduced by Goldwasser-Micali-Rivest in 1984 [31]. Since
then, many researchers have used this as a standard for measuring security for their
signature schemes. Generally speaking, a standard digital signature scheme should
meet the following requirements [53]:
• Correctness: A digital signature scheme is correct if, given a signing key SK
and corresponding verification key P K, for any message m ∈ M, the output
of signing algorithm Sign will always be accepted by the verification algorithm
Verify. Formally, for any m:

P r[(SK, P K) ← KeyGen(`); σ ← Sign(m, SK) ∧ Verify(m, σ, P K)] = 1
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• Unforgeability: A digital signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against chosen message attack if no adversary A, who has access to a signing
oracle SO (which outputs the valid signature for the message m), can produce a new message-signature pair (m, σ) with non-negligible probability. Formally, for any polynomial-time oracle ASOSK (·) , AdvA (`) = P r[(SK, P K) ←
KeyGen(`); σ ← ASOSK (·) (`) : Verify(m, σ, P K) = 1] ≤  where  is a negligible
function.
Definition 10 A signature scheme is secure if an existential forgery is computationally infeasible under an adaptive chosen message attack.

2.3.3

Nominative signatures

The classical digital signature has been widely used to provide integrity, authenticity,
and non-repudiation for authenticating electronic messages. However, sometimes the
users do not want the signature is publicly verifiable. Nominative signatures are not
publicly verifiable. Three parties are involved in nominative signatures: nominator,
nominee and verifier. The nominator and nominee jointly generate the signature and
only the nominee can verify it. Moreover, the validity of a nominative signature can
only be determined with the help of the nominee. Someone else (even the nominator)
should not be able to show the validity of the nominative signature to a verifier. In
1996, Kim et al. [37] proposed the first notion and construction of nominative
signature. However, it was found that the nominator could also verify the signature
in [35]. Then, Huang and Wang [35] proposed a new convertible nominative scheme.
The convertible means that the nominee can convert a nominative signature to a
publicly verifiable one. Unfortunately, in [33, 64, 66], they pointed out that it was
found that the nominator in Huang-Wang scheme can generate valid signatures on
his own and show the validity of the signature to anyone without the consent of the
nominee. In 2011, Schuldt and Hanaoka [60] proposed a stronger security model of
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nominative signature. A nominative signature (NS) consists of three probabilistic
polynomial-time(PPT) algorithms(SystemSetup, KeyGen, V ernominee ) and three
protocols (SigGen, Confirmation, Disavowal) [41].
- SystemSetup(System Setup): On input 1k where k ∈ N is a security parameter,
it generates a list of system parameters denoted by par.
- KeyGen(User Key Generation): On input par, it generates a public/ private
key pair (pk, sk).
- Vernominee (Nominee-only Verification): On input a message m, a nominative
signature σ, a public key pkA and a private key skB , it returns Accept or
Reject.
- SigGenProtocol : Common inputs of A and B are par and m. A’s additional
input is pkB , indicating that A nominates B as the nominee; and B’s additional
input is pkA indicating that A is the nominator. At the end, either A or B
outputs σ. The party who outputs σ should be explicitly indicated in the
actual scheme specification.
- Confirmation / Disavowal Protocol : On input (m, σ, pkA , pkB ), B sets µ to 1 if
valid ← V ernominee (m, σ, pkA , skB ); otherwise, µ is set to 0. B first sends µ to
C. If µ =1, the Confirmation protocol is carried out; otherwise, the Disavowal
protocol is carried out. At the end of the protocol, C outputs either Accept
or Reject while B has no output.
A nominative signature should also meet the following requirements:
1. Unforgeability: Unforgeability means that an adversary should not able to
forge a valid nominative signature if at least one of the private keys of A and
B is unknown.
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2. Invisibility: Invisibility means that it is impossible for an adversary to determine whether a given message-signature pair (m, σ) is valid without the help
of the nominee.
3. Security against impersonation: Security against impersonation means
that the validity of a nominative signature can only be determined by the help
of the nominee.
4. Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation means that the nominee cannot convince
a verifier C that a valid (invalid) nominative signature is invalid (valid).
More formal information about nominative signature will be introduced in Chapter 3.

2.3.4

Group signatures

A variation on the basic signature scheme, known as the group signature, was proposed by Chaum and van Heijst [15]. A group signature is a signature scheme that
allows any member of a group to digitally sign a document which a verifier can confirm came from the group, without revealing which individual in the group signed
the document. A group signature scheme usually consists of many signers and a
single group manager. In case of dispute, the group manager is able to find out
who actually produced the signature. Since its appearance, various group signature
schemes have been proposed, such as [10, 17, 52]. However, one disadvantage of
such a signature is that the length of the signatures is related to the size of the
group. This restricts the application of such schemes to small groups. Camenisch
and Stadler [13] presented a new group signature scheme which remains practical
even for large groups. The first efficient and provably secure group signature was
proposed in [3]. An extension of the group signature, called group blind signature,
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was first introduced by Lysyanskaya and Ramzan [43]. Group blind signatures incorporate the properties of both blind signatures and group signatures, which blind
signature is a form of digital signature in which the content of a message is disguised
(blinded) before it is signed. They can be used in many of the settings where blind
signatures are used. Particularly, they can be used to design privacy-protecting electronic payment systems. The other application areas of the group signature include
anonymous credentials, voting and bidding. The group signature usually consists of
the following algorithms [5]:
- Key Generation: It is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a system parameter
` as input, and outputs a tuple (GP K, GM SK, GSK), where GP K is the
group public key, GM SK is the group manager’s secret key, and GSK is an
n-vector of keys with GSK[i] being a secret key for user i ∈ {1...n}.
- Sign: It is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a message m ∈ M and a secret
key GSK[i] as input, and outputs a signature σ.
- Verify: It is a deterministic algorithm that takes a message m, a signature
σ and the group public key GP K as input, and outputs either Accept or
Reject.
- Open: It is a deterministic algorithm that takes the group manager’s secret
key GM SK, a message m and a signature σ as input, and outputs an identity
i or the symbol ⊥ to indicate failure.
A group signature should also meet the following requirements:
1. σ is a valid signature if and only if for all message m, for all key pairs
(GSK, GP K) output by Key Generation, it holds that Verify(m, Sign(m,
GSK[i]), GP K) = Accept.
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2. It is computationally infeasible for any entity other than the group member
Ui ∈ U to find, for any message m ∈ M, a group signature σ such that
Verify(m, Sign(m, GSK[i]), GP K) = Accept.
3. It is computationally infeasible for any entity to find, for any group signature
σ, the member Ui ∈ U who produce the signature.
4. The identity of the signer S can be revealed if and only if the group manager
runs Open(m, σ, GM SK).
More formal information about group signature will be introduced in Chapter 4.

2.4

Zero Knowledge Proofs

A Zero Knowledge Proof is an interactive method with which one party can prove
the truth of some statement to another without revealing anything other than the
truth of the statement [28]. The idea of the zero-knowledge proof was motivated by
the authentication system where one party wants to prove his identity to another
via some secret information, but does not want the other party to learn anything
about this secret. A zero knowledge proof should satisfy the following requirements
[28]:
1. Completeness: If the statement is true, the honest verifier will be convinced
of this fact by an honest prover.
2. Soundness: If the statement is false, no cheating prover can convince the
verifier this is true.
3. Zero-Knowledge: If the statement is true, no cheating verifier learns anything
other than this fact.

2.5. Hash Functions
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Hash Functions

A hash function is an efficient computable function which takes an arbitrary length
string m as input, and outputs a fixed length string h (that is, h = H(m)). The
resulting string is called the hash value, which is typically. The hash functions are
used for data integrity in conjunction with digital signature schemes. There are
various hash functions, such as MD5 [57] and SHA-1 [47]. In general they should
meet the following requirements:
- Pre-image: A hash function should be one way. That is, given any value m, it
is easy to compute H(m). But given a hash value h, it is computationally
infeasible to find some input m such that H(m) = h.
- Collision-free: Given a message m, it is computationally infeasible to find a
message m0 not equal to m such that H(m) = H(m0 ).
- Strong Collision-free: It is computationally infeasible to find any two messages
m and m0 such that H(m) = H(m0 ).

2.6

Signature of Knowledge

The first signature based on proof of knowledge(SPK) was proposed in [11]. We will
use the following definition of SPK from [11].
Let q be a large prime and p = 2q + 1 also be a prime. Let G be a finite cyclic
group of prime order p. Let g be a generator of Z∗p such that computing discrete
logarithms of any group elements (apart from the identity element) with respect
to one of the generators is infeasible. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` denote a strong
collision-resistant hash function.
Definition 11 A pair (c, s) ∈ {0, 1}` × Zq satisfying c = H(gkykg s y c km) is a
signature based on proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of a group element y
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to the base g of the message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and is denoted by SPK {α : y = g α }(m).
An SPK {α : y = g α }(m) can be computed if and only if the value (secret key) α
= logg (y) is known. This is also known as a non-interactive proof of the knowledge
α.
Definition 12 A pair (c, s) satisfying c = H(U kP kSkQksU + cSksP + cQkm) is
a signature of equality of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem of the group
element S with respect to the base U and the discrete logarithm problem of the group
element S with respect to the base U and the discrete logarithm of the group element
Q with respect to the base P for the message m. It is denoted by ECSPKEQ{α : Q
= αP ∧ S = αU}(m).

2.7

Security Proofs

One important task in designing a cryptographic scheme is to provide a security
proof. That is because without formal proof, the scheme may be vulnerable to some
unseen weakness. The idea of provable security was introduced by Goldwasser and
Micali [29] and formalised by Mihir Bellare [4]. It consists of the following steps:
1. Define the security goals, that is, what security requirements we want to
achieve.
2. Define a security model and set up an experiment between the attacker and
simulated environment under that model.
3. Select a hard mathematical problem as an atomic primitive.
4. Reduce the experiment to that atomic primitive and show that the only way
to defeat the scheme is to solve the underlying atomic primitive.
5. Conclude that since the hard problem is unsolvable, the success of the attacker
would lead to a contradiction, and therefore the scheme is secure.
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Cryptographic Tools

2.8.1

Bilinear Pairing

Bilinear pairing is a cryptography tool that has been used frequently in recent cryptography applications [8, 69, 71, 72]. It introduced here because the instantiation
in section 4.5 will use bilinear pairing. Here we define the basic concept of bilinear
pairing.
Let G1 , G2 be cyclic additive groups generated by P1 , P2 , respectively, whose
orders are both a prime q. Let GM be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same
order q. We assume there is an isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 such that ψ(P2 ) = P1 .
Let ê : G1 × G2 → GM be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P, Q)ab for all P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 , a, b ∈ Zq .
2. Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 such that ê(P, Q) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P, Q) for all
P ∈ G1 , Q ∈ G2 .
For simplicity, hereafter, we set G1 = G2 and P1 = P2 . We use the notation aP
to imply P a in G1 , and bQ to imply Qb in G2 .
A bilinear pairing instance generator is defined as a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm IG that takes as input a security parameter ` and returns a uniformly
random tuple par = (p, G1 , GM , ê, P ) of bilinear parameters, including a prime number p, a cyclic additive group G1 of order q, a multiplicative group GM of order q, a
bilinear map ê : G1 × G1 → GM and a generator P of G1 . For a group G of prime
order, we denote the set G∗ = G\{O} where O is the identity element of the group.
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Intractable Problems

In this section, we introduce some intractable problems that will be used in the
following chapters. A problem is intractable if there is no deterministic algorithm
that can solve the problem within a polynomial time. Our schemes base their
security on the intractability of the following mathematical problems:
Definition 13 Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem.
Suppose that G is a cyclic group and g is a generator of G. Given y ∈ G, the
problem is to compute x such that y = g x .
For the DL problem to be hard, the security parameter g must be large enough
so that there is no known algorithm for efficiently computing the integer x.
Definition 14 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem.
Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well as aP, bP and cP (for unknown randomly
chosen a, b, c ∈ Zq ), compute ê(P, P )abc .
For the BDH problem to be hard, G1 and GM must be chosen so that there is
no known algorithm for efficiently solving the Diffie-Hellman problem in either G1
or GM . We note that if the BDH problem is hard for a pairing ê, then it follows
that ê is non-degenerate. That is if ê(x, y) = 0 for all x ∈ G1 , then y = 0 and if
ê(x, y) = 0 for all y ∈ G1 , then x = 0.
Definition 15 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption.
If IG is a BDH parameter generator, the advantage AdvIG (A) that an algorithm
A has in solving the BDH problem is the probability that the algorithm A outputs
ê(P, P )abc on inputs G1 , GM , ê, P, aP, bP, cP, where (G1 , GM , ê) is the output
of IG for sufficiently large security parameter `, P is a random generator of G1
and a, b, c are random elements of Zq . The BDH assumption is that AdvIG (A) is
negligible for all efficient algorithms A. Negligible means the probability of things is
very low, so it is able to be ignored or excluded from consideration.
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Definition 16 Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem.
Given a randomly chosen P ∈ G1 , as well as aP, bP, for some unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q ,
compute abP.

2.8.3

Random Oracle Model

Random oracle model is a popular methodology used in security proofs when there
is no real function that provides the mathematical properties necessary to satisfy the
proof of security. The concept of the random oracle was built on the work of Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali [26, 27] and later formalised by Bellare and Rogaway [7].
Thereafter, many researchers have used the random oracle model in their security
proof as opposed to a generic model. In the random oracle model, we assume hash
functions are random functions and are publicly accessible by all parties. A random
oracle, O, is an object to instantiate all hash functions in the model and reply to all
queries from the parties. A polynomial time algorithm cannot distinguish between
the query reply from a real world and the random oracle simulated by a function.
A random oracle O should meet the following requirements [7]:
- O is assumed to be a random function such that given an input, no party can
guess the output with non-negligible probability.
- O is one-way function. Given an output, it is difficult to determine its preimage.
- O: {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∞ . Note {0, 1}∗ denotes the space of finite binary strings and
{0, 1}∞ denotes the space of infinite binary strings.
- O is collision resistant so that given x, y where x 6= y, O(x) = O(y) with negligible
probability.
- Given the same inputs x and y, where x = y, O(x) = O(y).

2.8. Cryptographic Tools

26

- All parties in the random oracle model must query O to obtain random values.
They cannot distinguish the values generated by O from the real hash function.
However, in reality there exists no hash function which behaves purely randomly.
Therefore a scheme that is secure in the random oracle model does not mean that
it is also secure in real life. Certain very artificial protocols are proven secure in
the random oracle model, but trivially insecure when any real hash function is
substituted for the random oracle. So the meaning of a security proof in the random
oracle model is still unclear. Despite its impracticalities, the random oracle model is
useful for yielding an efficient solution to prove the security of a scheme. It is better
than no proof at all.

Chapter 3
Secure Single Sign-on Schemes
Transformed from Nominative Signatures
Single Sign-on (SSO) allows users to log on only one time and then access different
services via automatic authentication using the same credential. However, most existing SSO schemes do not satisfy security notions or require a high trust level in the
trusted third party (TTP), even though SSO has become popular in new distributed systems and computer networks. Motivated by this fact, we formalise a security
model of single sign-on scheme, which not only satisfies strong security notions but
also has a low trust level in the TTP. We then propose a generic construction of SSO from nominative signatures, and present concrete initialisation. We also provide
formal proofs to show that the proposed SSO scheme is secure according to our new
formal model, if the underlying nominative signature is secure. We note that this
is the first study that investigates the link between SSO and nominative signatures,
which may be on independent interest.

3.1

Introduction

The growing number of internet based services increases the burden for users, because they may have to maintain more and more username/password pairs. This
is also insecure and inefficient with the growth in the number of services. Single
sign-on (SSO) is an authentication mechanism that allows users to log on only one
27
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time and then access different services via automatic authentication using the same
single credential. This means that SSO may be an effective way to make users relax
at their daily work.
Kerberos is one of the earliest single sign-on solutions, proposed by Steiner et
al. [62] in 1988, though it is called a network authentication system. The system
consists of an Authentication Server, a Ticket Granting Server and a set of service
providers. To acquire the Ticket Granting Ticket from a Ticket Granting Server, a
user should first go through the authentication with Authentication Server. Actually,
Authentication Server and Ticket Granting Server act together as a TTP (trusted
third party), or called trusted identity provider [34], in an SSO scheme. However,
both the process of authentication and the infrastructure management are very
complex. Moreover, unproven symmetric key mechanisms are used in Kerberos to
authenticate users, which may lead to potential security weaknesses.
Released in 2005, OpenID [49] is one of single sign-on solutions, which is an
open and decentralised approach for authenticating users. In OpenID, the user can
freely select the identity providers from any web based application he has registered
with. Before signing on to a given web base application that supports OpenID,
the user first signs on to the identity provider and OpenID exchanges the necessary
authentication data between the identity provider and the application. However,
the mechanism of exchanging data is complex and can be attacked through network
based techniques [21].
In 2010, Han et al. [34] proposed a novel dynamic SSO model together with a
generic scheme. This scheme employs a digital signature scheme to guarantee both
the unforgeability and the public verification of credential. In addition, broadcast
encryption is used to protect the privacy of credentials, which means that only
the authorised service providers can check the validity of a credential. After the
credential verification the user should run zero-knowledge proofs to prove that he/she
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is entitled to use the valid credential. This is to protect against impersonation
attacks. However, the broadcast encryption is a complex and rather inefficient.
In 2012, Yu et al. [70] proposed a single sign-on model with key exchange, and
the advantage is that each user does not need hold a public/private key pair, while
this is required in Han et al.’s model. However, the trust level in the TTP is higher
than that in Han et al.’s model, because in Yu et al.’s model the TTP is assumed
to not impersonate any user, which is rather unrealistic.
Unfortunately, most of existing SSO systems have shortcomings. For example,
in some SSO systems-like [24], when the user wants to access a service by using a
credential, the service provider (SP) has to directly communicate with the TTP because the SP cannot verify the validity of the credential by itself. Another drawback
is that some systems [39, 50, 51] have a single point of failure, as the TTP is required
to be always online. Moreover, SSO scheme proposed in [62] does not prevent illegal
usage of a personal credential, since an illegal user can access services if he obtains
a legal user’s valid credential. Furthermore, SSO systems given in [34, 70] require
a high level of trust in the TTP. Based on these shortcomings, we are motivated to
study single sign-on (SSO) in this paper by proposing a formal model and giving a
construction from nominative signatures.
Classical digital signatures have been widely used to provide integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation for authenticating electronic messages. However, sometimes
the users may not want their signatures being publicly verifiable. Nominative signature is such a primitive supporting no public verification. Three parties are involved
in nominative signatures: nominator, nominee and verifier. The nominator and
nominee jointly generate the signature and only the nominee can verify it. Moreover, the validity of a nominative signature can only be determined with the help
of the nominee. Someone else (even the nominator) should not be able to show the
validity of the nominative signature to a verifier.
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In 1996, Kim et al. [37] proposed the first notion and construction of nominative
signature. However, it was found that the nominator can also verify the signature
[35]. Then, Huang and Wang [35] proposed a new convertible nominative scheme,
in which the nominee can convert a nominative signature into a publicly verifiable
one when necessary. Unfortunately, in [33, 64, 66], it was found that the nominator
in Huang-Wang scheme can generate valid signatures alone and show the validity
of the signature to anyone without the consent of the nominee. In 2007, Liu et
al. [41] proposed a formal definition and a rigorous set of adversarial models for
nominative signature, which is based on Chaums undeniable signature [14] and a
strongly unforgeable signature scheme. In 2011, Schuldt and Hanaoka [60] proposed
a stronger security model of nominative signature with a provably secure scheme.
Our Contributions. In this chapter, we aim to formalise the notion of single signon (SSO). This notion is motivated by the need for strong security requirements
and low trust level in the TTP in a single sign-on system. Then, we construct a
generic SSO scheme from nominative signatures and prove that this SSO is secure in
the proposed security model, by assuming that the underlying nominative signature
is secure according to the model introduced by Schuldt and Hanaoka [60]. This
means that we establish a relation between a cryptographic primitive and a security
application: nominative signatures are a sufficient tool to construct SSO with low
trust level in the TTP. In addition, a concrete intialisation of the generic SSO is also
presented.
Chapter Organization. In Section 3.2, we propose the formal definition and security
notions for SSO. We review the formal definition and security notions of nominative
signature in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 proposes a generic construction of SSO based
on transforming nominative signatures. In Section 3.5, a concrete initialisation is
described. In Section 3.6, we provide formal security analysis of the proposed SSO
scheme. In Section 3.7, we give some discussions and a short summary.
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Formal Model of Single Sign-On

In this section, we provide a formal security model for single sign-on (SSO) model,
which specifies both the syntax and security properties of SSO.

3.2.1

Syntax of Single Sign-on

In a SSO model, a user (U) obtains a single credential from a trusted third party
(TTP) once and then authenticates himself to different service providers (SPs) using
the same credential. Now we formalise the syntax of SSO as follows by specifying
its components:
Definition 17 A Single Sign-on scheme comprises a trusted third party TTP, a
group of service providers SPs and a group of users U. It consists of four algorithms and two protocols: system setup algorithm Setup, user key generation algorithm
U KGen, enrollment algorithm Enrol, credential generation protocol CreGen, credential verification algorithm CreV er, and confirmation/disavowal protocol Con/Dis.
- Setup(k): On input 1k where k ∈ N is a security parameter, it returns a list
of public parameters par and a public-private key pair (tpk, tsk) of the TTP.
- U KGen(par): On input public parameters par, this probabilistic algorithm
returns a public-private key pair (upki , uski ) ← g(1k ) for a user.
- Enrol(par, RI): A service provider SPj0 s registration information RIj which
includes SPj0 s username and some other information, and a user Ui0 s registration information RIi which includes Ui0 s username. On input public parameters par, RIj or RIi , his public key upki and some other information, TTP
executes Enrol (par, RI) and returns IDj to SPj , or IDi = (Ui , upki , AUi ) to
Ui , where IDj and IDi are the identities of SPj and Ui , AUi is Ui0 s access
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right which is a set consisting of the identities of the service providers that the
user can access to.
- CreGen(tpk, upki , IDi , par)[T T P (tsk), Ui (uski )]: The public inputs are
TTP’s public key tpk, a user Ui ’s public key upki , Ui ’s identity IDi , and public
parameters par. TTP holds its private key tsk, and Ui holds his private key
uski . This algorithm outputs a credential Crei for user Ui .
- CreV er(Crei , uski , tpk, par): On input of a user Ui ’s credential Crei , Ui ’s
private key uski , TTP’s public key tpk and public parameters par, it returns
if Crei is valid or invalid.
- Con/Dis(Crei , upki , tpk, par)[Ui (uski ), SPj ]: The public inputs are a user Ui ’s
credential Crei and his public key upki , TTP’s public key tpk and public parameters par, while Ui ’s private input is his private key uski . If valid ←
CreV er(Crei , uski , tpk, par), the protocol Con is carried out; otherwise, the
protocol Dis is carried out. If the protocol Con runs successfully and SPj0 s
identity IDj ∈ AUi , SPj accepts Ui ’s authentication request; otherwise it rejects.
Remark 1 Compared to the formal models given in [34, 70], our model not only
satisfies the strong security notions (unforgeability and security against impersonation) of SSO, but also reduces the trust level in the TTP, because TTP can neither
generate the credential without the user’s involvement nor impersonate the user by
running Con protocol. Moreover, different from [34] no broadcast encryption is required here, so our model is simpler and more efficient.

3.2.2

Security Definitions of Single Sign-On

Security requirements are crucial for a security system. In the SSO scheme, the TTP
is mostly concerned about whether others can generate the credential without its
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involvement. User mainly worries about whether others who obtains his credential
can access to SPs by impersonating him. The service providers are mostly concerned
about whether their sevices can be accessed without holding a valid credential.
Therefore, in the following we propose and formalize three security notions which
should be considered. Namely, unforgeability, security against impersonation, and
soundness. To formalise each SSO security notion, we define a series of games
between two Turing machines: Challenger C and Adversary A.
Unforgeability
Intuitively, unforgeability means that any adversary A should not be able to forge a
credential of a user Ui if either the TTP’s private key tsk or the Ui0 s private key uski
is unknown. Formally, we say that a SSO scheme is unforgeable, if no polynomially
bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger C in the
following two games:
Game 1 Unforgeability I
• Setup. C runs Setup(k) to generate the public parameter par and the publicprivate key pair (tpk, tsk) of the TTP. C sends A par and tpk.
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui . A generates the publicprivate key pair (upki , uski ) of Ui by running U KGen and sends the registration information RIi to C. C returns IDi = (Ui , upki , AUi ) to A. Adaptively
means A can enroll user before and after he knows the target.
• Credential generation oracle. A can adaptively run the protocol CreGen by
using IDi with C. If the protocol runs successfully, A will receive a valid
credential Crei .
Finally, A outputs (ID∗ , Cre∗ ), where ID∗ = (U ∗ , upk ∗ , AU ∗ ). ID∗ means a
target IDi in here and then. A wins the game if
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1. V alid ← CreV er(Cre∗ , usk ∗ , tpk, par). and
2. ID∗ has not been queried to Credential generation oracle.
A’s advantage is defined to be the probability that A wins.
Remark 2 In this game, A can verify the credential by himself after he corrupted
the upki . Therefore, a verification oracle is not necessary.
Remark 3 In this game, Con/Dis execution oracles are also not provided. The
reason is that as the service provider SP does not hold any private parameter and A
can corrupt all the users, A can run the protocols Con or Dis alone by playing both
roles of SPj and Ui .
Game 2 Unforgeability II
• Initialization. C sends a target ID∗ = (U ∗ , upk ∗ , AU ∗ ) to A.
• Setup. C runs Setup(k) to generate the public parameter par and then sends
par to A. A generates the public-private key pair (tpk, tsk) of the TTP.
• Create user oracle. A can enroll user Ui . A generates the public-private key
pair (upki , uski ) of Ui by running U KGen and sends the registration information RIi to C. C returns IDi = (Ui , upki , AUi ) to A.
Finally, A outputs a credential Cre∗ . A wins the game if
1. V alid ← CreV er(Cre∗ , usk ∗ , tpk, par). and
2. A has not obtain usk ∗ .
A’s advantage is defined to be the probability that A wins.
Definition 18 A Single Sign-on system is said to be unforgeable if no PPT (Probabilistic Polynomial Time) adversary has a non-negligible advantage in either Game
1 or Game 2.
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Security against impersonation
Security against impersonation means that even though the adversary A has obtained the credential of a user Ui , A should not be able to impersonate Ui to access
to SPs by executing SSO protocols.
Formally, we say that a SSO scheme is secure against impersonation, if no polynomially bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger
C in the following game:
Game 3 Security against impersonation
• Initialization. C sends a target U ∗ with ID∗ and corresponding credential Cre∗
to A.
• Setup. C runs Setup(k) to generate the public parameter par and sends to A.
A generates the public-private key pair (tpk, tsk) of the TTP.
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui . A generates the publicprivate key pair (upki , uski ) of Ui by running U KGen and sends the registration information RIi to C. C returns IDi = (Ui , upki , AUi ) to A.
• Confirmation oracle. There are two cases:
1. A (as SPj ) can adaptively run the protocol Con with C (as U ∗ ) using
Cre∗ . This oracle returns accept or reject.
2. A (as eavesdropper) can adaptively eavesdrop the conversions when U ∗
using Cre∗ runs protocol Con or Dis with C (as SPj ). This oracle returns
accept or reject and the transcript of the protocol.
Finally, A has to run the confirmation protocol Con with a SPj . A wins the
game if
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1. SPj returns accept. and
2. A has not obtain usk ∗ .
A’s advantage is defined to be the probability that A wins the game.
Definition 19 A Single Sign-on system is said to be secure against impersonation
if no PPT adversary has a non-negligible advantage in Game 3.

Soundness
Soundness means that any adversary A should not be able to access to SPs if the
TTP does not generate a corresponding credential and sends it to A.
Formally, we say that a SSO scheme has soundness, if no polynomially bounded
adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger C in the following
game:
Game 4 Soundness
• Setup. C runs Setup(k) to generate the public parameter par and the publicprivate key pair (tpk, tsk) of TTP. It sends A the public parameter par and
the public key tpk of the TTP.
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui . A generates the publicprivate key pair (upki , uski ) of Ui by running U KGen and sends the registration information RIi to C. C returns IDi = (Ui , pki , AUi ) to A.
• Credential generation oracle. A can adaptively run the protocol CreGen by
using IDi with C. If the protocol runs successfully, A outputs a credential
Crei .
Finally, A has to select a target U ∗ with ID∗ and then runs protocol Con with
SPj . A wins the game if
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1. SPj returns accept. and
2. ID∗ has not been queried to the Credential generation oracle.
A’s advantage is defined to be the probability that A wins.
Remark 4 In this game, A has two ways to win the game: Forging a credential or
successfully running protocol Con without a valid credential. The first case has been
discussed in Game 1 and Game 2. Therefore, this game focuses on the second
case.
Definition 20 A Single Sign-on system is said to be sound if no PPT adversary
has a non-negligible advantage in Game 4.

3.3

Nominative Signatures

3.3.1

Syntax of Nominative Signatures

In this section, we describe one nominative signature scheme which was proposed in
[60]. A nominative signature scheme involves a signer S, a nominee N and a verifier
V, and is specified by the algorithms described below.
- Setup: The input is a security parameter 1k , it outputs a set of public parameters par.
- KeyGenS , KeyGenN : The input is the public parameters par, it outputs a
public-private signer and nominee key pair, (pkS , skS ) and (pkN , skN ), respectively.
- Sign: The inputs are par, pkN , a message m, and skS , it outputs a signature
generation message δ.
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- Receive: The inputs are par, pkS , m, a signature generation message δ, and
skN , it outputs a nominative signature σ on m.
- Convert: The inputs are par, pkS , m, σ, and skN , it outputs a verification
token tkσ .
- T kV erif y: The inputs are par, pkS , pkN , m, σ, and tkσ , it outputs either
accept or reject.
- (Confirm, VC ): this is a pair of interactive algorithms with common input
(par, pkS , pkN , m, σ). The algorithm Confirm is furthermore given skN as
private input. At the end of the interaction, VC will either output accept or
reject.
- (Disavow, VD ): like in the confirm protocol, this is a pair of interactive algorithms with the common input (par, pkS , pkN , m, σ), and Disavow is given
skN as private input. At the end of the interaction, VD will either output
accept or reject.
- V alid: The inputs are par, pkS , pkN , m, σ, skN , this algorithm computes the
verification token tkσ ← Convert(par, pkS , m, σ, skN ) and it outputs the
result of T kV erif y(par, pkS , pkN , m, σ, tkσ ).

3.3.2

Security Notions for Nominative Signatures

For a nominative signature scheme to be secure [60], the scheme should be unforgeable, invisible, and secure against malicious signers. Additionally, the confirm and
disavow protocols are required to be zero-knowledge proofs.
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uf −cma k
ExpN
S,A (1 )
LS ← {}
par ← Setup(1k )
(pkS , skS ) ← KenGenS (par)
∗
(pkN
, m∗ , σ ∗ , tkδ∗ , st) ← AO (par, pkS )
∗
z ←2 { A (st) ↔ VC (par, pkS , pkN
, m∗ , σ ∗ )}
∗
z 0 ← T kV erif y(par, pkS , pkN
, m∗ , σ ∗ , tkδ∗ )
∗
∗
if (pkN , m ) ∈
/ LS ∧ (z = accept ∨ z 0 = accept)
output 1
else output 0

Figure 3.1: Unforgeability security experiment
Unforgeability
Unforgeability requires that no one can generate a valid signatures without the signer
i.e. a malicious nominee should not be able to produce a signature on a message
m, and then convince a verifier that the signature is valid, either by running the
confirm protocol or by presenting a verification token, without having requested a
signature on m from the signer.
Formally, we define unforgeability against a chosen message attack (uf-cma) of
−cma
a nominative signature scheme N S via the experiment Expuf
shown in Figure
N S,A

3.1. By x ← AO (y) it means that the algorithm A is executed on input y while
being allowed to make queries to the oracle O, and that the output of A is assigned
to x. For a pair of interactive algorithms, A and V, we write z ←2 { A (x1 ) ↔ V
(x2 )} (y) to mean that A and V interact with common input y and private inputs
x1 and x2 to A and V, respectively, and that the output of V, upon the completion
of the interaction, is assigned to the variable z. Lastly, PPT algorithm is taken to
mean a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. In the experiment, A has access
to the oracle O = {OSign } defined as follows:
- OSign : The inputs are pkN and m, this oracle computes δ ← Sign(par, pkN ,
m, skS ), adds (pkN , m) to LS , and returns the signature generation message
δ to A.
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mal−sig k
ExpN
S,A (1 )
LR ← {}; LC ← {}
par ← Setup (1k )
(pkN , skN ) ← KenGenN (par)
(pkS∗ , m∗ , σ ∗ , tkδ∗ , st) ← AO (par, pkN )
z ← V alid(par, pkS∗ , pkN , m∗ , σ ∗ , skN )
z 0 ← T kV erif y(par, pkS∗ , pkN , m∗ , σ ∗ , tkδ∗ )
if z = accept
z 00 ←2 {A(st) ↔ VC (par, pkS∗ , pkN , m∗ , σ ∗ )}
else
z 00 ←2 {A(st) ↔ VD (par, pkS∗ , pkN , m∗ , σ ∗ )}
if (z = accept ∧(pkS∗ , m∗ , σ ∗ ) ∈
/ LR ) ∨
0
∗
∗
∗
(z = accept ∧(pkS , m , σ ) ∈
/ LC ) ∨
(z 00 = accept)
output 1
else output 0

Figure 3.2: Malicious signer security experiment
Definition 21 A nominative signature scheme N S is said to be uf-cma secure if
uf −cma
−cma k
all PPT adversaries A have advantage AdvN
= P r[Expuf
S,A
N S,A (1 ) = 1] which

is negligible in k .
Security against Malicious Signers
Our definition of security against malicious signers requires that any adversary with
the knowledge of the private signer key should not be able to (1) produce a new
valid nominative signature associated to the nominee, (2) convince a verifier about
the validity or invalidity of a signature through the confirm or disavow protocols,
regardless of the signature being valid or not, or (3) produce an accepting verification
token for a signature he has not previously seen a verification token for.
Formally, security against malicious signers of a nominative signature scheme N S
shown in Figure 3.2. In the experiment, A
is defined via the experiment Expmal−sig
N S,A
has access to the oracles O = {OReceive , OConvert , OCon , ODis } defined as follows:
- OReceive : The inputs are pkS , m and δ. This oracle computes σ ← Receive(par,
pkS , m, δ, skN ), adds the tuple (pkS , m, σ) to the list LR , and returns σ to A.
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- OConvert : The inputs are pkS , m and σ. This oracle adds the tuple (pkS , m, σ)
to LC and returns the verification token tkσ ← Convert(par, pkS , m, σ, skN ).
- OCon : The inputs are pkS , m and σ. This oracle interacts with A by running
Confirm with the common input (par, pkS , pkN , m, σ) and the private input
skN .
- ODis : The inputs are pkS , m and σ. This oracle interacts with A by running
Disavow with the common input (par, pkS , pkN , m, σ) and private input skN .
Definition 22 A nominative signature scheme N S is said to be mal-sig secure if
mal−sig
k
all PPT adversaries A have advantage AdvN
= P r[Expmal−sig
S,A
N S,A (1 ) = 1] which

is negligible in k .

Invisibility
To ensure that no information leaked from the signer will reveal the validity of a
signature, invisibility requires that an adversary with the knowledge of the private
signer key, cannot distinguish between a valid signature, and a random element of
the signature space.
Formally, we define invisibility under a chosen message attack (inv-cma) of a
inv−cma
nominative signature scheme N S via the experiment ExpN
shown in Figure
S,A

3.3 where M (par) is the message space defined by par. In the experiment, A has
access to the oracles O = {OReceive , OConvert , OCon , ODis } defined as above.
Definition 23 A nominative signature scheme N S is said to be inv-cma secure if
inv−cma
all PPT adversaries A have advantage AdvN
= P r[Expinv−cma
(1k ) = 1]- 1/2
N S,A
S,A

which is negligible in k .
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Expinv−cma
(1k )
N S,A
par ← Setup(1k )
∗
∗
(pkN
, skN
) ← KenGenN (par)
∗
(pkS∗ , m∗ , δ ∗ , st) ← AO (par, pkN
)
b ← {0, 1}
if b = 0
σ ∗ ← Receive(par, pkS∗ , m∗ , δ ∗ , skN )
else (b = 1)
(pkN , skN ) ← KenGenN (par)
(pkS , skS ) ← KenGenS (par)
m ← M(par)
δ ← Sign(par, pkN , m, skS )
σ ∗ ← Receive(par, pkS , m, δ, skN )
0
b ← AO (st, σ ∗ )
if b = b0 output 1
else output 0
Figure 3.3: Invisibility security experiment
Protocol Security
Lastly, we require the confirm and disavow protocols to be zero-knowledge proofs.
More specifically, consider the languages L(par) and L̄(par) parameterized by par
and defined by
L(par) = {(pkS , pkN , m, σ) : ∃skN s.t.(pkN , skN ) ∈
{KeyGenN (par)}∧ V alid(par, pkS , m, σ, skN )
= accept}
L̄(par) = {(pkS , pkN , m, σ) : ∃skN s.t.(pkN , skN ) ∈
{KeyGenN (par)} ∧ V alid(par, pkS , m, σ, skN )
= reject}
The confirm protocols is required to be a zero-knowledge proof of membership for L,
whereas the disavow protocol is required to be a zero-knowledge proof of membership
for L̄.
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Generic Construction

This section describes how a nominative signature scheme can be directly transformed into an SSO scheme, where a nominative signature is employed as a user’s
credential.
1. Setup(k): Runs the Setup(k) to generate the public parameters par, which
includes all public parameters in this scheme, and runs KeyGenS (par) to
generate the public-private key pair (tpk, tsk) of the TTP.
2. Enrol(par, RI):
• Service providers enrollment: SPj submits registration information RIj
which includes the SPj0 s username and some other information to the
TTP. TTP issues an identity IDj to SPj , and stores (SPj , IDj ) for SPj .
• Users enrollment: Ui generates his public-private key pair (upki , uski ) by
running KeyGenN (par). Ui sends his registration information RIi which
includes the Ui0 s username, public key upki and some other information
to the TTP. The TTP issues an identity IDi = (Ui , upki , AUi ) to Ui ,
where AUi is a set that consists of the identities of the service providers
that the user can access, and stores (Ui , IDi ) for Ui .
3. CreGen(tpk, upki , IDi , par)[T T P (tsk), Ui (uski )]: Ui submits his IDi and TTP
checks it. If IDi has been registered, the TTP executes Sign(par, upki , IDi , tsk)
and sends a signature generation message δi to Ui . Ui executes Receive(par, tpk,
IDi , δi , uski ) and outputs a nominative signature σi . The credential of Ui is
Crei = (IDi , σi ).
4. CreV er(Crei , uski , tpk, par): Ui verifies the Crei by executing V alid(par,
tpk, upki , IDi , σi , uski ). If it returns accept, then do the next step.
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5. Con (Crei , upki , tpk, par)[Ui (uski ), SPj ]: Ui sends Crei to SPj , the protocol
Conf irm(par, upki , tpk, IDi , σi )[U (uski ), SPj ] is carried out. If the confirmation protocol runs successfully, SPj executes the next step. Otherwise SPj
aborts.
If the user wants to access to other SPs whose identities are listed in AUi , he
can send credential to them directly, without having to request the TTP to issue a
new credential for him.

3.5

Instantiation

Now, we present a concrete SSO scheme by instantiating the above generic SSO
with the concrete nominative signature scheme proposed by Schuldt and Hanaoka
in [60], while their scheme is inspired by [42, 68].
1. Setup(k): given 1k , choose a bilinear map e: G1 × G1 → GT where |G1 | = p,
and a generator hgi = G1 . Then pick a collision resistant hash function H:
{0, 1}∗ → Zp and return par ← (e, p, g, H). Given par, pick αS , v0 , ..., vn ← Zp
and hS ← G1 , and compute gS = g αS and ui = g vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Furi
where mi is the i-th
thermore, for m ∈ {0, 1}n , define FS (m) = u0 Πni=1 um
i

bit of m, and finally set the TTP’s public-private key pair (tpk, tsk) as tpk
← (gS , hS , u0 , ..., un ) and tsk ← αS .
2. Enrol(par, RI):
• Service providers enrollment: given par, SPj0 s registration information
RIj which includes SPj0 s username and some other information. The
TTP issues an identity IDj to SPj , and stores (SPj , IDj ) for SPj .
• Users enrollment: given par, pick αN , y1 , y2 , v0 ,..., vn ← Zp and hN ,
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k ← G1 , and compute gN = g αN . Furthermore, for m ∈ {0, 1}n , dei
fine FN (m) = u0 Πni=1 um
where mi is the i-th bit of m. Lastly comi
−1

pute x1 ← g y1

−1

and x2 ← g y2 , and finally Ui0 s generates his public-

private key pair (upki , uski ) as upki ← (gN , hN , k, u0 , ..., un , x1 , x2 ) and
uski ← (αS , v0 , ..., vn , y1 , y2 ). Given par, Ui registration information RIi
which includes Ui0 s username, public key upki and some other information. The TTP issues an identity IDi = (Ui , upki , AUi ) to Ui , where AUi
is a set that consists of the identities of the service providers that the
user can access, and stores (Ui , IDi ) for Ui .
3. CreGen(tpk, upki , IDi , par)[T T P (tsk), Ui (uski )]: Round 1: given par, upki ,
IDi , and tsk, pick r ← Zp , and compute δ1 = g r and δ2 = hαSS FS (upki ||IDi )r .
Lastly the TTP returns δ = (δ1 , δ2 ) to Ui . Round 2: given par, tpk, IDi , δ and
uski , firstly check that e(gS , hS )e(δ1 , FS (upki ||IDi )) = e(g, δ2 ) holds. If this is
not the case, return ⊥. Otherwise, pick r, r0 , s = Zp and re-randomize δ by
0

0

−1

computing δ10 = δ1 g r and δ20 = δ2 FS (upki ||IDi )r . Then set σ1 ← (δ10 /g r )y1
−1

and σ2 ← (g r )y2 , and compute t = H(σ1 ||σ2 ||tpk||IDi ) and M = g t k s . Finally
n

set σ3 ← δ20 hαNN (δ10 )v0 +Σi=1 vi Mi , where Mi is the i-th bit of M, and Ui outputs
the signature σi ← (σ1 , ..., σi , s) and the credential Crei = (IDi , σi ).
4. CreV er(Crei , uski , tpk, par): given par, tpk, Crei = (IDi , σi ) and uski , first
check that the equation e(g, σ3 ) = e(gS , hS )e(gN , hN )e(σ1y1 , σ2y2 , FS (upki ||IDi )
FN (M )) hold, and if this is not the case, output ⊥. Otherwise, return the
verification token tkσ ← (σ1y1 , σ2y2 ). Given par, tpk, upki , Crei = (IDi , σi ) and
tkσ = (tk1 , tk2 ), output valid if the equations e(σ1 , g) = e(tk1 , x1 ), e(σ2 , g) =
e(tk2 , x2 ), and e(g, σ3 ) = e(gS , hS )e(gN , hN )e(σ1y1 , σ2y2 , FS (upki ||IDi )FN (M ))
hold. Otherwise, output invalid.
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5. Con (Crei , upki , tpk, par)[Ui (uski ), SPj ]: given (par, tpk, upki , Crei ) as common input and uski as the private input to Ui , let e1 = e(g, σ3 ), e2 = e(gS , hS )
e(gN , hN ), e3 = e(σ1 , FS (upki ||IDi )FN (M )) and finally let e4 = e(σ2 , FS (upki ||
IDi )FN (M )) where M = g t k s , and t = H (σ1 ||σ2 ||tpk||IDi ). Then Ui and SPj
interacts in the protocol

ZKP K{(y1 , y2 ) : xy11 = g ∧ xy22 = g ∧ e1 = e2 ey31 ey42 }

If the protocol runs successfully, SPj returns accept. Otherwise, SPj returns
reject.

3.6

Security Analysis

Theorem 1 The SSO scheme proposed above is unforgeable if the nominative signature scheme used above is unforgeable and secure against malicious signers.
Suppose there exists an adversary A which can break the unforgeability of our
generic construction for SSO. We will show that there exists an adversary B which
can break the unforgeability or the security against malicious signers of above nominative signature scheme. There are two cases for unforgeability.
Unforgeability I
• Initialization. B receives the public parameter par and a public key pkS , and
B runs A. B simulates an SSO scheme by setting pkS as the public key tpk of
the TTP and par as the public parameter. Then B sends (par, tpk) to A.
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui . A generates the publicprivate key pair (upki , uski ) of Ui by running U KGen and sends the registration information RIi to B. B returns IDi = (Ui , upki , AUi ) to A.
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• Credential generation oracle. A can adaptively run the protocol CreGen by
using IDi with B. B redirects these queries to N S model’s oracle OSign . If
the protocol runs successfully, A outputs a credential Crei = (IDi , σi ).
Finally, A outputs (ID∗ , Cre∗ ), where ID∗ = (U ∗ , upk ∗ , AU ∗ ) and Cre∗ =
(ID∗ , σ ∗ ). According to the Game 1, ID∗ has not been queried to the Credential
generation oracle.
If V alid ← CreV er(Cre∗ , usk ∗ , pkS , par), namely A outputs a valid σ ∗ . So
(upk ∗ , ID∗ ) ∈
/ LS ∧ accept ← T kV erif y(par, pkS , upk ∗ , ID∗ , σ ∗ , tkδ∗ ). This means
B can use A to break the unforgeability of the underlying nominative signature
according to Definition 21 and Figure 3.1.
Unforgeability II
• Initialization. B receives the public parameter par and a public key pkN , and
B runs A. B sends a target ID∗ = (U ∗ , pkN , AU ∗ ) to A.
• Setup. B sends the public parameter par to A. A executes N S model’s
algorithm KeyGenS to generate the TTP’s public-private key pair (pkS , skS ).
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui . A generates the publicprivate key pair (upki , uski ) of Ui by running U KGen and sends the registration information RIi to B. B returns IDi = (Ui , upki , AUi ) to A.
Finally, A outputs a credential Cre∗ = (ID∗ , σ ∗ ) of U ∗ . According to the Game
2, A has not obtained skN .
If V alid ← CreV er(Cre∗ , pkS , skN , par), namely A outputs a valid σ ∗ . So accept
← Valid(par, pkS , pkN , ID∗ , σ ∗ , skN ) ∧ (pkS , ID∗ , σ ∗ ) ∈
/ LR . This means B can
use A to break the security against malicious signers of the underlying nominative
signature specified in Definition 22 and Figure 3.2.
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Therefore, by combining Unforgeability I and Unforgeability II, we can conclude
that the SSO scheme proposed above is unforgeable if the underlying nominative
signature scheme is unforgeable and secure against malicious signers.



Theorem 2 The SSO scheme proposed above is secure against impersonation if the
nominative signature scheme used above is secure against malicious signers.
Suppose there exists an adversary A with non-negligible advantage in Game 3.
We will show that there exists an adversary B which can break the security against
malicious signers of the above nominative signature scheme.
∗
, and
• Initialization. B receives the public parameter par and a public key pkN

B sends the public parameter par to A. A executes the N S model’s algorithm
KeyGenS (par) to generate the TTP’s public-private key pair (pkS , skS ) and
sends (pkS , skS ) to B.
∗
, ID∗ , skS ) where
• Setup. B executes the N S model’s algorithm Sign(par, pkN
∗
ID∗ = (U ∗ , pkN
, AU ∗ ) and require the N S model’s oracle OReceive to get

a tuple (pkS , ID∗ , σ ∗ ). B sends a target U ∗ with ID∗ and corresponding
credential Cre∗ = (ID∗ , σ ∗ ) to A.
• Create user oracle. A can adaptively enroll user Ui . A generates the publicprivate key pair (upki , uski ) of Ui by running U KGen and sends the registration information RIi to B. B returns IDi = (Ui , upki , AUi ) to A.
• Confirmation oracle. There are two cases:
1. A (as SPj ) can adaptively run the protocol Con with B (as the user U ∗
who is uncorrupted) using Cre∗ . B redirects these queries to the N S
model’s Oracle OCon . It returns accept or reject.
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2. A (as an eavesdropper) can adaptively eavesdrop the uncorrupted user
U ∗ using Cre∗ runs protocol Con with B (as SPj ). B redirects these
queries to the N S model’s Oracle OCon . It returns the accept or reject
and the transcript of the protocol.
A runs protocol Con with SPj . According to the Game 3, A has not obtained
∗
skN
.

If SPj returns accept, namely A can successfully run the Confirm protocol with∗
∗
out skN
. So accept ←2 {A(st) ↔ VC (par, pkS , pkN
, ID∗ , σ ∗ )}. This means that B

can use A to break the security against malicious signers of the underlying nominative signature scheme specified in Definition 22 and Figure 3.2.
Therefore, the SSO scheme proposed above is secure against impersonation if
the underlying nominative signature scheme is secure against malicious signers. 
Theorem 3 The SSO scheme proposed above is sound if the nominative signature
scheme used above is protocol secure.
Protocol security in the N S scheme means that the confirm and disavow protocols should be zero-knowledge proofs. According to [38], zero-knowledge requires
that if the statement is false, no cheating prover can convince the honest verifier that
it is true. Therefore, if the nominative signature scheme proposed above is protocol
secure, when A does not obtain the corresponding valid credential, A should not
be able to convince the SPs that he has the corresponding valid credential. Therefore, the SSO scheme proposed above is sound if the nominative signature scheme
proposed above is protocol secure.
The details of reduction are similar to the proofs for Theorems 1 and 2, and they
are omitted.
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Discussion and Summary

In this section, we compare our scheme and Han et al.’s [34] scheme. In terms of
security, both schemes can resist forging attack and impersonation attack. Moreover,
both schemes can satisfy the requirement of soundness because of a zero-knowledge
proof. However, the level of trust in the TTP of our scheme is lower, because the
TTP can not generate a credential by himself. In terms of efficiency, Han’s scheme
uses broadcast encryption, which reduces the efficiency of whole scheme. In our
scheme, it is guaranteed that even though the attacker obtains the content of a
credential, the attacker can not break the security of our scheme. Therefore, our
new SSO scheme meets stronger security and is more efficient. The table 3.1 is the
comparison about security notions between two schemes.
Security notions
unforgeability
impersonation
soundness
trust level in the TTP

our scheme
yes, and stronger
yes
yes
low

Han et al.’s scheme [34]
yes
yes
yes, but not mentioned
high

Table 3.1: The comparison about security notions
In conclusion, based on the observation that the current SSO systems suffer from
various security issues, we formalised a security model of single sign-on scheme and
implemented a generic SSO by using any secure nominative signature scheme. In
our model, a SP is not required to communicate with the TTP when it verifies the
credential; an illegal person can not access to the SPs even though he/she obtains
a user’s valid credential; the soundness is satisfied and furthermore, the dependence
on the trusted third party is reduced.

Chapter 4
Anonymous Single Sign-on Transformed
from Group Signatures
Single Sign-on (SSO) allows a user to obtain a single credential from a Trusted
Third Party (TTP) once and then to authenticate himself/herself to different service providers using the same credential. Though different SSO schemes have been
obtained from various primitives, user anonymity for SSO systems has not previously been studied formally. Since anonymity is an essential security requirement in
certain scenarios. For example, in the scenarios of subscription of online magazines,
news, and digital library or digital resource control in organisations. We first formalize a security model of anonymous single-sign on (ASSO). Subsequently, we present
a generic ASSO scheme which is transformed from group signatures. Formal proofs
are provided to show that the proposed ASSO is secure under the assumption that
the underlying group signature is secure according to Bellare et al.’s model introduced at CT-RSA 2005 [6]. Compared to existing SSO schemes, our transformation
not only implements the user’s anonymity, but also reduces the trust level in the
TTP.

4.1

Introduction

With the frequent use of the internet, users often access multiple services on a daily
basis, and therefore they may have to maintain a lot of username/password pairs.
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Nevertheless, with the growth in the number of service providers this approach
becomes either inefficient if each login should be unique for each service, or insecure
if the same login is used for multiple services. As many as one third of users [61, 63]
tend to use the same or similar passwords to access their services. Moreover, it is
also a considerable burden for service providers if they have to manage credentials
for dealing with credential issuing, updating, revocation, etc. Fortunately, in a
single sign-on (SSO) model, during a given period (eg. one day) a user may perform
just one single sign-on to a trusted third party (TTP), which is trusted by the
applications he/she needs to access. Later on, each time the user wants to access an
application, he/she will be automatically authenticated by the interaction between
his client and the TTP, without requiring direct involvement from the user.
Kerberos is one of the earliest single sign-on solutions, proposed by Steiner et
al. [62] in 1988, though it is called a network authentication system. The system
consists of an Authentication Server, a Ticket Granting Server and a set of service
providers. To acquire the Ticket Granting Ticket from a Ticket Granting Server, a
user should first go through the authentication with Authentication Server. Actually
an Authentication Server and a Ticket Granting Server act together as a TTP (called
trusted identity provider in [34]) in an SSO scheme. However, both the process of
authentication and the infrastructure management are very complex. Moreover,
unproven symmetric mechanisms are used in Kerberos to authenticate users, which
may lead to potential security weaknesses.
Released in 2005, OpenID [49] is successful single sign-on solution. It is an
open and decentralized standard for authenticating users. In OpenID, the user can
freely select the identity providers from any web base application he has registered
with. Before signing on to a given web based application that supports OpenID,
the user first signs on to the identity provider and OpenID exchanges the necessary
authentication data between the identity provider and the application. However, the
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mechanism of exchanging the necessary authentication data between the identity
provider and the application is complex and can be attacked through network based
techniques [21].
In 2010, Han et al. [34] proposed a novel dynamic SSO model together with
a generic scheme. This scheme employs a digital signature to guarantee both the
unforgeability and the public verifiability of credentials. In addition, broadcast encryption is used to protect the privacy of credential, which means only the authorised
service providers nobody can check the validity of a credential. After the credential
verification the user should run zero-knowledge proofs to prove that he/she is entitled to use the valid credential, for resisting against impersonation attacks. However,
the broadcast encryption is a complex and inefficient process.
In 2012, Yu et al. [70] proposed a single sign-on model with key exchange, and
the advantage is that each user does not need to hold a public/private key pair,
while this is required in Han et al.’s model. However, the trust level in the TTP
is higher than that in Han et al.’s model, because in Yu et al.’s model the TTP is
assumed to not impersonate any user, which is rather unrealistic.
Anonymity in electronic communication is very important for users in many scenarios, as they may prefer not to provide personal information to service providers.
But their membership of a group or association should be verified. For example,
if a web site or online forum does not support user anonymity, it may be hard to
attract a good number of comments and discussions. The main reason is that users
may be afraid of talking freely to avoid potential problems, as some sensitive topics
may be involved. In addition, anonymity usually can prompt users to do something
about behaving uncharacteristically, abnormally or atypically in real life.
Unfortunately, most of existing SSO systems have shortcomings. For example,
in some SSO systems like [24], when the user wants to access a service by using
a credential, the service provider (SP) has to directly communicate with the TTP
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because SP cannot verify the validity of credential. Another drawback is that some
systems [39, 50, 51] are fragile to resist single point of failure, as the TTP is required
to be always online. Moreover, SSO scheme proposed in [62] does not prevent illegal
usage of a personal credential, since an illegal user can access services if he obtains
a legal user’s valid credential. Further more, SSO systems given in [34, 70] require
high trust level in the TTP and anonymity is not implemented. To the best of our
knowledge, anonymity in SSO has only been informally introduced in the scenario
of Global System for Mobile communication by Elmufti et al [25]. In this system,
to access each SP a user will use a different one-time ID as a temporary identity to
authenticate himself to a TTP (the GSM network operator), and TTP then forward
users request to the SP. So, the user is anonymous for the SP as the SP only knows
the user’s temporary ID, not his real identity. In this system, single point of failure
may be an issue and users are NOT anonymous to the TTP.
Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and Van Heyst [15], implement the
anonymity of signers, in contrast to the classical digital signature. With in-depth
study, more security requirements were proposed in [1, 17]. After that, Bellare et
al. [5, 6] proposed the formal definitions of group signatures.
Our Contributions. In this work, we aim to formalize the notion of anonymous single
sign-on (ASSO). This notion is motivated by the important need of anonymity
in single sign-on systems. For example, in the scenarios of subscription of online
magazines, news, and digital library or digital resource control in organisations. At
the same time, we observe that anonymity has not been formally studied in SSO
and that almost no SSO scheme support anonymity. Therefore, we are motivated to
formally study anonymous single sign-on (ASSO) in this work by proposing the first
formal model and presenting a generic ASSO construction transformed from any
group signature scheme, which satisfies the security notions proposed in [6]. Formal
proofs are also provided to show that this ASSO is secure according to the proposed
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formal definitions. Though the transformation from group signature to ASSO is
seemingly straightforward, the novelty of our work is twofold. On the one hand,
our formal model is carefully formalised to capture security requirements in ASSO,
in which group signature may not necessarily be the only implementation tool. On
the other hand, our formal security analysis concludes that group signatures (under
a proper model) are a sufficiently strong building block to implement ASSO. In
addition, our results also mean that ASSO forms one more potential application
of group signatures, which have been extensively investigated in literature but lack
for real applications, except a variant technique called direct anonymous attestation
(DAA) that has been employed as the core mechanism in trusted computing [9].
Chapter Organization. In Section 4.2, we formalize the security model of anonymous
single sign-on (ASSO) scheme. Then, we review the formal definition and security
notions for group signatures in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, a generic construction of
ASSO from group signature is described. Compared to previous SSO solutions given
in [34, 70], there are two main advantages in our generic ASSO: users are anonymous,
and the trust level in the TTP is reduced as only the user knows his/her credential
so that nobody can impersonate him. In Section 4.5, we provide formal proofs to
show the security of our scheme. Finally, we give a short summary and discuss our
future work in Section 4.6.

4.2

Formal Model of Anonymous Single Sign-On

In this section, we provide a security model to formally define anonymous single
sign-on (ASSO). This model specifies the functions of ASSO and the security requirements that an ASSO should satisfy.
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Syntax of Anonymous Single Sign-on

In an ASSO scheme, a user (U) obtains a credential from a trusted third party
(TTP) once and then authenticates himself to different service providers (SPs) by
generating a user proof via using the same credential. SPs can confirm the validity
of each user but should not be able to trace the user’s identity. Now we formalize
the components of ASSO as follows.
Definition 24 An anonymous single sign-on (ASSO) scheme involves a trusted
third party TTP, a group of service providers SPs and a group of users U. It consists
of five algorithms and one protocol: system setup algorithm Setup(·), user proof
generation algorithm U P Gen(·), user proof verification algorithm U P V er(·), user
tracing algorithm T race(·), user tracing verification algorithm N otary(·) and user
enrollment protocol Enrol.
- Setup(k): By taking a security parameter 1k as an input, this algorithm outputs
a tuple (tpk, tik, tok), where tpk is the TTP’s public key, tik is the TTP’s
private issuing key, and tok is the TTP’s private opening key.
- Enrol: A user can enrol in the system by running Enrol protocol with the
TTP. Firstly, a user Ui generates his personal public/private key pair (upki , uski ).
Then Ui sends a request with his/her upki to the TTP. If the TTP accepts according to some registration policy (such as charging subscription fee), it uses
the private issuing key tik to generate a registration certificate for Ui , denoted
as regi . Then, the TTP will send regi to user Ui , and store a copy of this
certificate in its registration table reg as well. Finally, Ui can get his credential
Crei = (regi , ski ), where ski is Ui ’s signing key, which is generated from regi
and uski .
- U P Gen(tpk, Crei , m): By taking the inputs of the TTP’s public key tpk, Ui ’s
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credential Crei and a message m, this algorithm outputs a user proof upi
showing user Ui ’s knowledge of credential Crei .
- U P V er(tpk, m, upi ): By taking the inputs of the TTP’s public key tpk and a
message/user proof pair (m, upi ), this algorithm outputs 1 or 0 for accepting
or rejecting upi as a valid user proof.
- T race(reg, tok, m, upi ): By taking the inputs of registration table reg, the
TTP’s private opening key tok and a valid message/user proof pair (m, upi ),
this algorithm outputs an integer i (i ≥ 0) and a proof-string τ . If i ≥ 1, i
denotes an identity; otherwise it means no group member produced this upi .
Output τ is the associated evidence, which will be used in N otary algorithm.
- N otary(tpk, i, upki , m, upi , τ ): By taking inputs of the TTP’s public key tpk,
an integer i ≥ 1, the public key upki of Ui , a valid message/user proof pair
(m, upi ), and a proof-string τ , this algorithm checks whether τ is a valid proof
showing that Ui has generated upi for message m.
Remark 5 Each user Ui ’s personal private key uski is only used to generate his
credential when he enrols into the system, while the corresponding public key upki
can be published through a PKI online or some approach off-line.
Remark 6 Compared to Han et al.’s formal model [34] and Yu et al.’s formal model
[70], the most obvious advantage in our model is to achieve anonymity. In addition,
the trust level in the TTP in our model is the lowest, because the TTP can neither
generate the credential without the user’s involvement nor impersonate the user.
Moreover, there is no broadcast encryption and key exchange in our model, thus our
model is simpler.
Remark 7 We cannot simply add some additional algorithms to the previous SSO
model to get a new ASSO model. Firstly, ASSO requires two TTPs (i.e. an issuer

4.2. Formal Model of Anonymous Single Sign-On

58

and tracer), while in SSO only one TTP. Second, in SSO a user’s private key is
generated by him/herself, but in ASSO this is an interactive procedure between the
issuer and the user. Thirdly, in SSO a user’s credential is an interactive procedure
between the user and the TTP, but in ASSO this is generated by him/herself.

4.2.2

Security Definitions of Anonymous Single Sign-On

In this section, we will formally define the security notions of ASSO, including
correctness, anonymity, traceability and non-frameability. Correctness is the basic
requirement which ensures that a scheme works if all parties honestly follow the algorithms and protocols as specified. Anonymity protects users’ privacy by requiring
that SPs can only confirm the validity of each user but are not able to know the
user’s identity. The TTP and SPs concern traceability because it can ensure that a
user can neither generate a valid user proof without a credential nor get a valid credential without TTP’s endorsement. The users also concern non-frameability as it
means that any adversary, including malicious TTP and/or SPs, cannot impersonate
a user.
Correctness
Correctness of ASSO requires that (a) a user proof generated by an honest user
should be valid; (b) the T race algorithm, given a valid pair of message and user
proof, should correctly identify the user who generated this proof; and (c) the proof
τ returned by the T race algorithm should be accepted by the N otary algorithm.
Definition 25 Formally, an anonymous single sign-on system is correct if for any
k ∈ N, any (tpk, tik, tok) ← Setup(1k ), a valid credential Crei for each identity i,
and any m ∈ {0, 1}∗ , there is no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A
which can break any of three requirements listed below:
• U P V er(tpk, m, U P Gen(tpk, Crei , m)) = 1
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• T race(reg, tok, m, U P Gen(tpk, Crei , m)) = (i, τ )
• N otary(tpk, i, upki , m, upi , τ ) = true, where (i, τ ) is output by T race algorithm
with regard to (m, upi ).
Anonymity
Anonymity means that for any adversary A, even he knowing the issuing key tik of
TTP and the private key uski and credential Crei of every user, he should still not
be able to deduce who has generated a given user proof.
Definition 26 Formally, an anonymous single sign-on scheme is said to be anonymous, if no PPT adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger
C in Game 5 defined below.
Game 5 Anonymity
- Setup. C runs the algorithm Setup(1k ) to generate the tuple (tpk, tik, tok)
and then sends (k, tpk) to adversary A. C now initialises a number of users
denoted as a list LU , together with the corresponding registration table reg.
- Running Queries. C will run three oracles for adversary A in this phase:
Corrupt TTP Oracle I, Corrupt User Oracle and Tracing Oracle.
A could query the corrupt TTP oracle I to obtain the private issuing key tik
and the registration table reg. This oracle simulates the compromise of the
issuing key and registration table.
A could query the corrupt user oracle by sending an index i, where Ui ∈ LU ,
to obtain the private key uski and the credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui from
C. A list LCU is assumed initially empty and updated by LCU ← LCU ∪ {Ui }.
This oracle simulates A’s ability to collude or compromise as many users as
they like.
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A could query the tracing oracle by sending a valid message-user proof pair
(mi , upi ) to obtain the corresponding identity i and a proof τ , which is the
output returned by challenger C after execution of T race algorithm with regard
to (reg, tok, mi , upi ). If i > 0, it means that Ui is traced as the user who
generated (mi , upi ); while i = 0 means that there is no group member being
traced as the issuer of (mi , upi ) w.r.t. the current reg. An opened messageuser proof list LO is assumed initially empty and updated by LO ← LO ∪
{(mi , upi )}.
- Challenge: A selects a message m∗ and two indices i0 6= i1 of its choice,
where both Ui0 , Ui1 ∈ LU , and sends them to C. C responds back with a user
proof upib , where b ∈ {0, 1} is a random bit and upib = U P Gen(tpk, Creib , m∗ ).
- Output: A outputs a bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1} for guessing b. During this phase, A
can access all the above three oracles with the restrictions that (m∗ , upib ) has
not been asked via opening oracle. If b∗ = b, A wins the game. Formally, the
advantage of adversary A in this game is defined as

∗
O
∗
∗
∗
/ LO ] − 1/2
Advanon
ASSO,A (k) = Pr[b ← A (k, m , upib )|b = b ∧ (m , upib ) ∈

Remark 8 In this game, A is allowed to obtain the private issuing key tik, so he
can enrol new users by himself and change the content of the registration table reg,
which is the copy held by A itself. Note that according to the definition above, A
can corrupt the credential of any user, including the target users Ui0 and Ui1 . For
this reason, it is not necessary to offer A the user proof generating oracle.

Traceability
Traceability means that any PPT adversary A, who may know the opening key tok
of the TTP and corrupt the private key/credential (uski , Crei ) of as many users as he
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likes, should still be unable to generate a message/user proof pair (m, up) that cannot
be traced to a user or that can be traced to a user Ui but N otary(tpk, i, m, upi , τ )
= false.
Definition 27 Formally, an ASSO scheme is traceable, if no PPT adversary A
has a non-negligible advantage against the challenge C in the game defined below.
Game 6 Traceability
- Setup. C runs Setup(1k ) to generate the tuple (tpk, tik, tok) and initialises a
number of users, denotes by the list LU , together with registration table reg.
Then, k, tpk, LU and reg are sent to adversary A.
- Running Queries. C will run three oracles in this phase: Corrupt TTP
Oracle II, Enrol Oracle and Corrupt User Oracle.
A could query the corrupt TTP oracle II to obtain the private opening key tok.
This oracle simulates the compromise of opening key.
A could query the enrol oracle to enrol a new user Ui with C by running
Enrol protocol. If A performs honestly, he knows the private key uski and
is able to obtain credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui , where regi is returned
from the challenger C. Correspondingly C will update the registration table by
reg ← reg∪{regi }. This oracle simulates A’s ability to collude or compromise
as many as new users.
A could query the corrupt user oracle by sending an index i, where Ui ∈ LU ,
to obtain the private key uski and the credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui from
C. A corrupted user list LCU is assumed initially empty, and then updated by
LCU ← LCU ∪{Ui }. This oracle simulates A’s ability to collude or compromise
as many as users initialised by challenger C.
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- Output. Finally, A outputs a message m∗ and a user proof up∗ . If up∗ turns
out to be a valid user proof for m∗ , C will try to trace it to a user. If it traces to
nonmember or if it traces to a user Uj but N otary(tpk, j, m∗ , up∗ , τ ) = false,
then A wins the game. Formally, A’s advantage in this game is defined by
∗
∗
O
∗
∗
Advtrac
ASSO,A (k) = Pr[(m , up ) ← A (k)|U P V er(tpk, m , up ) = 1∧

(T race(reg, tok, m∗ , up∗ ) = (0, τ ) ∨ (T race(tok, m∗ , up∗ ) =
(j, τ ) ∧ N otary(tpk, j, m∗ , up∗ , τ ) = f alse))].
Remark 9 In this game, as A is allowed to obtain the private opening key tok, A
can open any message-user proof pair (m, up) by himself without needing an opening
oracle. Moreover, note that both unforgeability of credential [34, 70] and soundness of
SSO [70] are implied by traceability as defined above. On the one hand, according to
Definition 27 without the knowledge of tik A is not able to forge a valid credential for
a new user and then employ this credential to generate user proofs (unforgeability).
On the other hand, in Definition 27 it is infeasible for A to generate a valid user
proof without holding a valid credential (soundness).
Non-frameability
Non-frameability means that any PPT adversary A, even that he can corrupt the
TTP and all users except the target uncorrupted user U ∗ , should still be unable to
generate a valid message/user proof pair (m∗ , up∗ ), which traces to user U ∗ . In other
words, non-frameability implies that even a malicious TTP colluding with dishonest
users is still unable to frame a honest user by forging a valid user proof.
Definition 28 An anonymous single sign-on system satisfies non-frameability,
if no PPT adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger in the
game defined below.
Game 7 Non-frameability
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- Setup: C runs algorithm Setup(1k ) to generate a tuple (tpk, tik, tok), and
initialises a number of users, denoted by the list LU , together with the corresponding registration table reg. Then, C sends (k, tpk, LU ) to adversary A.
- Running Queries: C will run three oracles in this phase: Corrupt TTP
Oracle, Corrupt User Oracle, and Generate User Proof Oracle.
A could query the corrupt TTP oracle to obtain the issuing key tik, the opening
key tok and the registration table reg. This oracle simulates A’s ability to
compromise or collude with the TTP.
A could query the corrupt user oracle by sending an index i, where Ui ∈ LU ,
to obtain the private key uski and the credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui from
C. A corrupted user list LCU is assumed initially empty, and then updated by
LCU ← LCU ∪{Ui }. This oracle simulates A’s ability to collude or compromise
as many as users initialised by challenger C.
A could query the generate user proof oracle by sending a message-user pair
(mi , Ui ) to obtain a valid user proof upi from challenger C, where Ui ∈ LU and
upi = U P Gen(tpk, Crei , mi ). A generated user proof list, denoted as LU P ,
which is initialised as empty, will be updated by LU P ← LU P ∪ {(mi , Ui , upi )}.
- Output: Finally, A outputs a message m∗ and a user proof up∗ . If U P V er(tpk,
m∗ , up∗ ) = 1, C will try to trace this user proof. A wins the game, if a user
Uj ∈ LU is traced, but Uj has never been corrupted by A in corrupt user oracle
and (m∗ , Uj , ∗) has never been returned in the generate user proof oracle. A’s
advantage in this game is defined by
∗
∗
O
∗
∗
Advnonf
ASSO,A (k) = Pr[(m , up ) ← A (k, LU )|U P V er(tpk, m , up ) = 1 ∧ Uj ∈

LU \LCU ∧(m∗ , Uj , ∗) ∈
/ LU P , where T race(tpk, tok, m∗ , up∗ )
= (j, τ )].
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Remark 10 The above definition of non-frameability also covers credential privacy
[34, 67, 70], which is defined to guarantee that colluded dishonest service providers
should not be able to fully recover a user’s credential and then impersonate the user
to log in to other service providers.

4.3

Dynamic Group Signatures

A number of group signatures under several models have been proposed. In this
section, we review a formal model of dynamic group signatures, proposed by Bellare
et al. [6]. In the next section, we will present a transformation from any dynamic
group signature scheme to an ASSO.

4.3.1

Syntax of Dynamic Group Signatures

A dynamic group signature scheme GS comprises a trusted party for generating
keys, two authorities called the issuer and opener, and a body of users, each with a
unique identity i ∈ N. A GS is specified as a tuple (GKg, UKg, Join, Iss, GSig, GVf,
Open, Judge) of polynomial-time algorithms whose intended usage and functionality
are described as follows, where k ∈ N denotes the security parameter.
- GKg: This is a group key generation algorithm which is run by the trusted
party. The input is 1k and the output is a triple (gpk, ik, ok). The issuer key
ik is provided to the issuer, and the opening key ok is provided to the opener.
The group public key gpk, whose possession enables signature verification, is
made public.
- UKg: This is a user-key generation algorithm which is run by users. The input
is 1k and the output is a personal public and private key pair (upk[i], usk[i]).
The table upk is assumed to be public. That is, anyone can obtain an authentic
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copy of the personal public key of any user. This might be implemented via a
PKI.
- Join, Iss: Once a user has its personal key pair, it can join the group by engaging in a group-joining protocol with the issuer. The interactive algorithms
Join, Iss implement, respectively, the user’s and issuer’s sides of this interaction. Each takes input an incoming message (this is ε if the party is initiating
the interaction, so it is a symbol shows who initiates the interaction) and a
current state, and returns an outgoing message, an updated state, and a decision which is one of accept, reject, continue. The communication is assumed
to take place over secure (i.e. private and authenticated) channels, and we assume the user sends the first message. If the issuer accepts, it makes an entry
for i, denoted reg[i], in its registration table reg, the contents of this entry
being the final state output by Iss. If user i accepts, the final state output by
Join is its private signing key, denoted gsk[i].
- GSig: This is a group signing algorithm which is run by a group member
i. The inputs are its signing key gsk[i] and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ , and the
output is a quantity called a signature on m.
- GVf : This is a deterministic group signature verification algorithm which
anyone can run. The inputs are gpk, a message m, and a candidate signature
σ for m, and the output is a bit. We say that σ is a valid signature of m with
respect to gpk if this bit is 1.
- Open: This is a deterministic opening algorithm which is run by the opener,
who has read-access the registration table reg being populated by the issuer.
The inputs are opening key ok, the registration table reg, a message m, and a
valid signature σ of m under gpk. The output is a pair (i, τ ), where i ≥ 0 is an
integer. Where i ≥ 1, the algorithm is claiming that the group member with
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identity i produced σ and where i = 0, it is claiming that no group member
produced σ. In the former case, τ is a proof of this claim that can be verified
via the Judge algorithm. This algorithm can trace a message-signature pair
to a user.
- Judge: This is a deterministic judge algorithm. The inputs are the group
public key gpk, an integer j ≥ 1, the public key upk[j] of the entity with
identity j (this is φ if this entity has no public key, which means Open is
executed wrong), a message m, a valid signature σ of m and a proof-string
τ . It aims to check that τ is a proof that j produced σ. We note that the
judge will base its verification on the public key of j. This algorithm can verify
whether Open algorithm runs right or not.

4.3.2

Security Notions

According to [6], the correctness and security definitions of dynamic group signatures
will be defined by experiments in which an adversary has access to certain oracles,
which will be reviewed below first. Moreover, the oracles in each of these experiments
are assumed to maintain and manipulate the global variables: a set HU of honest
users; a set CU of corrupted users; a set GSet of message-signature pairs; a table
upk such that upk[i] contains the public key of i ∈ N; a table reg such that reg[i]
contains the registration information of group member i. The sets HU, CU, GSet,
as well as all entries of the tables upk and reg, are assumed initially empty, denoted
as ε.
- AddU (·): This is called the add user oracle and takes an identity i ∈ N as input.
The adversary uses this oracle to add i to the group as an honest user. The
oracle first inserts i to the set HU of honest users. Then the oracle generates
a personal public and private key pair (upk[i], usk[i]) for i, and executes the
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group-joining protocol honestly by running Join and Iss on behalf of user i
and the issuer respectively. Finally, it returns upk[i] to the calling adversary.
- CrptU (·, ·): This is called the corrupt user oracle and takes an identity i ∈ N
and a string upk as input. The adversary corrupts user i and sets its personal
public key upk[i] to the value upk which is chosen by the adversary. The oracle
initialises the issuer’s state in anticipation of a group-joining protocol with i.
- SndT oI(·, ·): After corrupting a user, the adversary playing the role of the user
can this oracle to run a group-joining protocol with the honest Iss-executing
issuer. The inputs are a corrupted user i and a message Min . The oracle,
which maintains the issuer’s state (the latter having been initialized by an
earlier call to CrptU (·, ·)), computes a response as per Iss. It returns the out
going message to the adversary, and sets entry reg[i] of the registration table
to Iss’s final state if the latter accepts.
- SndT oU (·, ·): After corrupting a user, the adversary playing the role of the
issuer can use this oracle to run a group-issuing protocol with an honest Joinexecuting user. The inputs are an identity i and a message Min . The oracle
maintains the state of user i, initializing this the first time it is called by
choosing a personal public and private key pair for i. Then it computes a
response as per Join, returns the outgoing message to the adversary, and sets
the private signing key of i to Join’s final state if the latter accepts.
- U SK(·): This is called the user secret keys oracle and takes an identity i ∈ N as
input. It returns the corresponding private signing key gsk[i] and the personal
private key usk[i] to the adversary.
- RReg(·): This is called the read registration table oracle and takes an identity
i ∈ N as input. It returns the corresponding reg[i] to the adversary.

4.3. Dynamic Group Signatures

68

- W Reg(·, ·): This is called the write registration table oracle and takes an identity i ∈ N and an entry reg[i] as input, so that the adversary can write/modify
the contents of entry i of the registration table reg.
- GSig(·, ·): This is the called signing oracle and takes an identity i and a
message m as input. The oracle returns the adversary the signature of m
under the private signing key gsk[i] of i, as long as i is an honest user whose
private signing key is defined.
- Ch(b, ·, ·, ·): This is called the challenge oracle for defining anonymity, and it
depends on a challenge bit b. The inputs from the adversary are a pair (i0 , i1 )
of identities and a message m, and the oracle will return the signature σ of m
under the private signing key of ib , as long as both (i0 , i1 ) are honest users with
defined private signing keys. The oracle records (m, σ) in message-signature
set GSet to guarantee that the adversary will not call the opening oracle on it
later.
- Open(·, ·): This is called the opening oracle and takes a message m and signature σ as input. The oracle returns the adversary the output of the opening
algorithm on (m, σ), computed under the opener’s key ok, as long as σ was
not previously returned in response to a query to Ch(b, ·, ·, ·).

Correctness
We formalize correctness via an experiment involving an adversary. For a dynamic group signature scheme GS, any adversary A and any k ∈ N we describe the
experiment Expcorr
GS,A (k) depicted in Figure 4.1. We let
corr
Advcorr
GS,A (k) = Pr[ExpGS,A (k) = 1].
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Experiment Expcorr
GS,A (k)
(gpk, ik, ok) ← GKg(1k ); CU ← ∅; HU ← ∅;
(i, m) ← A(gpk : AddU (·), RReg(·))
If i ∈
/ HU then return 0; If gsk[i] = ε then return 0
σ ← GSig(gpk, gsk[i], m); If GV f (gpk, m, σ) = 0 then return 1
(j, τ ) ← Open(gpk, ok, reg, m, σ); If i 6= j then return 1
If Judge(gpk, i, upk[i], m, σ, τ ) = 0 then return 1 else return 0
Figure 4.1: Experiments used to define correctness
anon−b
Experiment ExpGS,A
(k)
// b ∈ {0, 1}
k
(gpk, ik, ok) ← GKg(1 ); CU ← ∅; HU ← ∅; GSet ← ∅
d ← A(gpk, ik: Ch(b, ·, ·, ·); Open(·, ·); SndT oU (·, ·); RReg(·); W Reg(·, ·);
U SK(·); CrptU (·, ·))
Return d

Figure 4.2: Experiments used to define anonymity
We say the dynamic group signature scheme GS is correct if Advcorr
GS,A (k) = 0 for
any adversary A and any k ∈ N. Note that the adversary is not computationally
restricted.

Anonymity
For a dynamic group signature scheme GS, any PPT adversary A, a bit b ∈ {0, 1}
and any k ∈ N we describe the experiment Expanon−b
GS,A (k) depicted in Figure 4.2. We
let
anon−1
anon−0
Advanon
GS,A (k) = | Pr[ExpGS,A (k) = 1] − Pr[ExpGS,A (k) = 1]|.

We say the dynamic group signature scheme GS is anonymous if the function Advanon
GS,A (·) is negligible for any polynomial-time adversary A.
Traceability
For a dynamic group signature scheme GS, any adversary A, and any k ∈ N we
describe the experiment Exptrace
GS,A (k) depicted in Figure 4.3. We let
trace
Advtrace
GS,A (k) = Pr[ExpGS,A (k) = 1].
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Experiment Exptrace
GS,A (k)
(gpk, ik, ok) ← GKg(1k ); CU ← ∅; HU ← ∅
(m, σ) ← A(gpk, ok: SndT oI(·, ·); AddU (·); RReg(·); U SK(·); CrptU (·, ·))
If GVf(gpk, m, σ) = 0 then return 0; (i, τ ) ← Open(gpk, ok, reg, m, σ)
If i = 0 or Judge(gpk, i, upk[i], m, σ, τ ) = 0 then return 1 else return 0
Figure 4.3: Experiments used to define traceability
Experiment Expnf
GS,A (k)
(gpk, ik, ok) ← GKg(1k ); CU ← ∅; HU ← ∅
(m, σ, i, τ ) ← A(gpk, ok, ik: SndT oU (·, ·); W Reg(·); GSig(·, ·); U SK(·);
CrptU (·, ·))
If GVf(gpk, m, σ) = 0 then return 0
If the following are all true then return 1 else return 0:
- i ∈ HU and gsk[i] 6= ε and Judge(gpk, i, upk[i], m, σ, τ ) = 1
- A did not query USK(i) or GSig(i, m)
Figure 4.4: Experiments used to define non-frameability
We say the dynamic group signature scheme GS is traceable if the function Advtrace
GS,A (·) is negligible for any polynomial-time adversary A.
Non-frameability
For a dynamic group signature scheme GS, any PPT adversary A, and any k ∈ N
we describe the experiment Expnf
GS,A (k) depicted in Figure 4.4. We let
nf
Advnf
GS,A (k) = Pr[ExpGS,A (k) = 1].

We say the dynamic group signature scheme GS is non-frameable if the function
Advnf
GS,A (·) is negligible for any polynomial-time adversary A.
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Generic Construction of an ASSO from Group
Signatures

In this section, we give a generic construction of an ASSO from a dynamic group
signature. This means that any group signature GS satisfying the definition given
in Section 4.3 can be used to derive an ASSO scheme.
- Setup(1k ): This runs group signature GS’s key generation algorithm GKg(1k )
to obtain the tuple (gpk, ik, ok), and then sets (tpk, tik, tok) = (gpk, ik, ok).
- Enrol: A user can enrol in the system by running Enrol with the TTP. Firstly,
user Ui runs GS’s algorithm UKg(1k ) to generate a key pair (upk[i], usk[i]),
and sets (upki , uski ) = (upk[i], usk[i]). Then, Ui sends a request to the TTP.
If the TTP accepts, it uses the issuing key tik to run GS’s algorithm Iss to
generate an certificate for Ui , denoted as regi , which will be stored in the
registration table reg and sent to Ui as well. If Ui accepts, he runs GS’s
algorithm Join to generate his signing key gsk[i]. Finally, the credential of Ui
is defined as Crei = (regi , ski ) where ski = gsk[i].
- U P Gen(tpk, Crei , m): This runs GS’s algorithm GSig(ski , m) to generate a
signature σ, and outputs the user proof upi = σ.
- U P V er(tpk, m, upi ): This runs GS’s algorithm GVf (tpk, m, upi ) to verify if
upi is a valid group signature on m, and correspondingly outputs 1 or 0 for
accepting or rejecting upi as a valid user proof for message m.
- T race(reg, tok, m, upi ): This runs GS’s algorithm Open(tok, reg, m, upi ) to
output an integer i and a proof-string τ . If i ≥ 1, i denotes Ui ; otherwise
it means no group member produced this upi . Output τ is the associated
evidence, which will be used in N otary algorithm.
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- N otary(tpk, i, upki , m, upi , τ ): This runs GS’s algorithm Judge(tpk, i, upki , m,
upi , τ ) to check whether τ is a proof that Ui generated upi .

4.5

Instantiation

Our ASSO construction is a generic transformation from Bellare et al.’s dynamic
group signature model [6]. This implies that any secure group signature follow
Bellare et al.’s model, such as [32, 48], can be used to instantiate our ASSO scheme.
In this section, we select the group signature scheme which proposed by Nguyen
and Safavi-Naini [48] to instantiate our scheme, because their scheme is efficient
and secure. In [48], they proposed a new group signature scheme from bilinear
pairings. The new scheme is trapdoor-free and has fixed sizes for signatures and
keys.
- Setup: Suppose ` is a security parameter and the Bilinear Pairing Instance
Generator G generates a tuple of bilinear pairing parameters t = (p, G1 , G2 , e,
P ) ← G(1` ). The components of this tuple are the publicly. Choose a hash
function H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp , which is assumed to be a random oracle in the
security proofs.
Choose P0 , G, H ∈R G1 , x, x0a , x0b ∈R Z∗p and compute Ppub = xP , Oa =
0

0

e(G, G)xa and Ob = e(G, G)xb . The group public key is tpk = (P, P0 , Ppub , H,
G, Oa , Ob ), the issuing key tik = x, and the opening key is tok = (x0a , x0b ).
- Enrol: A user can enrol in the system by running Enrol protocol with
the TTP. Firstly, a user Ui generates his personal public/private key pair
(upki , uski ) by inputting a security parameter 1` . Then Ui and TTP runs the
protocol as follows.
1. Ui → TTP: I = yP + rH, where y, r ∈R Z∗p .
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2. Ui ← TTP: u, v ∈R Z∗p
3. Ui computes xi = uy + v, Pi = xi P .
4. Ui → TTP: Pi and a proof of knowledge of (xi , r0 ) such that Pi = xi P , r0
= ur and vP + uI - Pi = r0 H.
5. The TTP verifies the proof which is a zero-knowledge proof, then chooses
ai ∈R Z∗p different from all corresponding elements previously issued, and
computes Si =

1
(Pi
ai +X

+ P0 ), ∆i = e(P, Si ). TTP also makes an entry

in the table reg: regi = (i, ∆i , hEnrolitranscript).
6. Ui ← TTP: ai , Si , regi .
7. The user computes ∆i = e(P, Si ), verifies if e(ai P + Ppub , Si ) = e(P, xi P +
P0 ), and stores the private signing key ski = (xi , ai , Si , ∆i ). Finally Ui
can get his credential Crei = (regi , ski ).
- U P Gen: Encrypt ∆i with public key (G, Oa , Ob ) as (Ea = tG, Qa = ∆i Qta ,
Eb , Qb , ζ). Ui does the following steps to generate the user proof:
1. Generate r, r0 , k0 , ..., k6 ← Zp and compute: V = Si + rH; R = rG
Q
+ r0 H; T1 = k1 G + k2 H; T2 = k3 G + k4 H - k5 R; T3 = k6 G; 1 =
Q
e(P, P )k0 e(P, V )−k5 e(P, H)k3 e(Ppub , H)k1 ; 2 = e(P, H)−k1 Oak6 .
2. Compute c = H2 (P k P0 k Ppub k H k G k Oa k Ob k Ea k Qa k Eb k Qb k
ζ k V k R k T1 k T2 k T3 k Π1 k Π2 k m).
3. Compute in Zp : s0 = k0 + cxi ; s1 = k1 + cr; s2 = k2 + cr0 ; s3 = k3 +
crai ; s4 = k4 + cr0 ai ; s5 = k5 + cai ; s6 = k6 + ct.
Finally, the user proof for message m is upi = (c, s0 , ..., s6 , V , R, Ea , Qa , Eb ,
Qb , ζ).
- U P V er: This algorithm outputs Accept if and only if verifying the proof ζ
outputs Accept and the following equation holds: c = H2 (P k P0 k Ppub k
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H k G k Oa k Ob k Ea k Qa k Eb k Qb k ζ k V k R k s1 G + s2 H − cR k s3 G +
s4 H − s5 R k s6 G − cEa k e(P, P )s0 e(P, V )−s5 e(P, H)s3 e(Ppub , H)s1 e(P, P0 )c
c
e(Ppub , V )−c k e(P, H)−s1 Oas6 Q−c
a e(P, V ) k m).

- T race: To trace m and its valid user proof up to find the Ui , the TTP performs
the following steps:
1. If U P V er(m, up) returns Reject. This algorithm returns (0, ε), where ε
denotes an empty string.
2. Compute ∆i = Qa e(Ea , G)−xa and find the corresponding entry i in the
table reg. If no entry is found, return (0, ε).
3. Return regi and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof τ of knowledge
0

of x0a so that Oa = e(G, G)xa and Qa /∆i = e(Ea , G)xa .
- N otary: On an output by the T race algorithm for a message m and its user
proof up, the N otary algorithm is performed as follows:
1. If T race algorithm outputs (0, ε), run U P V er algorithm on (m, up). If
U P V er rejects, return Accept; otherwise, return Reject.
2. If T race algorithm outputs (regi , τ ), return Reject if one of the following happens: (i)on (m, up) U P V er algorithm rejects; (ii)verification of
the proof τ rejects; (iii)the hEnroli transcript is invalid with regard to
upki ; (iv)∆i 6= e(P, Si ) where Si is extracted from the hEnroli transcript.
Otherwise, return Accept.
In the group signature scheme proposed by Nguyen and Safavi-Naini [48], the
sizes of signatures and keys are much shorter than those used in the Strong-RSAbased schemes at a similar level of security. They show that in a same experiment, for
the scheme proposed by Ateniese et. al [3], the lengths of signature, group manager’s
public key, private issuing key, private opening key and group member’s signing key
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are 1087 bytes, 768 bytes, 128 bytes, 128 bytes, and 370 bytes, respectively. For the
new scheme proposed by Nguyen and Safavi-Naini, the lengths of signature, group
manager’s public key, private issuing key, private opening key and group member’s
signing key are 574 bytes, 363 bytes, 22 bytes, 44 bytes, and 192 bytes, respectively.
We can see that the sizes in Nguyen and Safavi-Naini’s scheme is approximately one
half of Ateniese et. al’s one. Thus our transformation can be efficiently implemented
in concrete instantiation. It can be seen in table 4.1.
Ateniese et. al’s scheme [3]
Nguyen and Safavi-Naini’s scheme [48]

σ
gpk
1087 768
574 363

ik
ok sk
128 128 370
22 44 192

Table 4.1: The length (bytes) of keys and signature in two schemes

4.6

Security Proofs

It is straightforward to see that correctness of a dynamic group signature (Section
4.3.2) implies the correctness of our generic ASSO described above according to
Definition 25. Now, we prove that other properties can be guaranteed as well.
Theorem 4 The ASSO scheme proposed above is anonymous if the dynamic group
signature scheme used above is anonymous.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A which can break the anonymity
of our generic construction of ASSO. We will show that there exists an adversary B
which can break the anonymity of the dynamic group signature scheme GS, which
is used to construct ASSO.
• Initialization.. B receives the security parameter k ∈ N, a public key gpk and
a private key ik. B sets gpk as the public key tpk of the TTP and ik as the
private issuing key tik of the TTP. As B knows ik, it initialises a number of
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users in the list LU and generates the corresponding registration table reg by
running Join and Iss algorithms. Then, B runs A by simulating oracles for A
as follows.
• Corrupt TTP Oracle I: If A queries the partially corrupt TTP oracle I, A gives
B the private issuer key tik and the registration table reg.
• Corrupt User Oracle: If A queries the corrupt user oracle by sending an index i,
where Ui ∈ LU , B retrieves regi from reg, redirects this query to GS’s oracle
U SK(i) to get uski , and calculates ski from regi and uski . Then, B will
respond to A with the private key uski and the credential Crei = (regi , ski )
of Ui . In addition, a corrupted user list LCU , assumed initially empty, will be
updated by LCU ← LCU ∪ {Ui }.
• Opening Oracle: If A queries the opening oracle by sending a message mi and
a user proof upi . B redirects this query to GS’s oracle Open(·, ·) to get a pair
(i, τ ). Then, (i, τ ) will be forwarded to A. List LO , assumed initially empty,
will be updated by LO ← LO ∪ {(mi , upi )}.
Once A selects a message m∗ and two indices i0 and i1 , B will forward (m∗ , i0 , i1 )
to his challenger, who will respond back with a signature σb to B. Then, B returns
the user proof upb = σb to A.
Finally, A will output a guess b∗ ∈ {0, 1}. If A can break the anonymity of our
generic construction for ASSO, b∗ = b will be true with non-negligible probability
and (m∗ , upb ) ∈
/ LO . This means that B can just forward b∗ to his challenger to break
the anonymity of the dynamic group signature scheme with the same non-negligible
probability. It is also easy to see that B’s running time is polynomial if A’s is.
Therefore, the ASSO scheme proposed above is anonymous if the dynamic group
signature scheme used above is anonymous.
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Theorem 5 The ASSO scheme proposed above is traceable if the dynamic group
signature scheme used above is traceable.
Proof. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A which can break the traceability
of our generic construction for ASSO. We will show that there exists an adversary
B which can break the traceability of above dynamic group signature scheme GS. C
is the challenger of GS.
• Initialization.. B receives the public parameter k ∈ N, a public key gpk and
a private opening key ok from the challenger C. B simulates an ASSO system
by setting the tuple (gpk, ik, ok) as the TTP’s key tuple (tpk, tik, tok), where
the issuing key ik of GS is not known to B but it can be implicitly set as
the private issuing key of ASSO. Then, B initialises a number of users in the
list LU by enquiring oracle AddU (·), which is provided by challenger C of GS.
After that, B can get the registration table reg by enquiring RReg(·) oracle.
Now, B sends (k, tpk, LU , reg) to A, and then runs sub-routine A as follows.
• Corrupt TTP Oracle II: If A queries the corrupt TTP oracle II, B simply
returns the private opening key tok to A.
• Enrol Oracle: If A queries the enrol oracle with B by running Enrol protocol to
enrol a new user Ui with user public key upki . If A behaves honestly on behalf
of Ui , B can obtain regi by enquiring oracle SndT oI(·, ·), which is provided
by challenger C of GS. Then, B will update reg by reg ← reg ∪ {regi } and
forwards regi to A so that A can obtain both uski which is selected by A
on behalf of Ui and Ui ’s credential Crei = (regi , ski ), where ski is calculated
from uski and regi .
• Corrupt User Oracle: If A queries the corrupt user oracle by sending an index
i, where Ui ∈ LU . To get (uski , regi , Crei ) B redirects this query to U SK(·)
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oracle and RReg(·) oracle which are provided by C. Then, B forwards A the
private key uski and the credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui . The corrupted
user list LCU , assumed initially empty, is updated by LCU = LCU ∪ {Ui }.
Finally, A outputs a message-user proof pair (m∗ , up∗ ). As A can break the
traceability of our generic ASSO construction, with a non-negligible probability
(m∗ , up∗ ) should be valid and it will trace to a non-member or to a user U ∗ but
N otary(tpk, ∗, m∗ , up∗ , τ ) = false. So, by setting σ ∗ = up∗ , B can trivially forward
a message-signature pair (m∗ , σ ∗ ) as its forgery to break the traceability of the
dynamic group signature scheme GS used to construct our ASSO. According to the
definition given in Section 4.2.2, it is not difficult to see that attacker B breaks
the traceability of the underlying group signature GS with the same non-negligible
probability in polynomial time.
Therefore, the ASSO scheme proposed above is traceable if the dynamic group
signature scheme used above is traceable.



Theorem 6 The ASSO scheme proposed above is non-frameable if the dynamic
group signature scheme used above is non-frameable.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A which can break the nonframeability of our generic ASSO construction. We will show that there exists
a PPT adversary B which can break the non-frameability of the dynamic group
signature scheme GS used in our ASSO. Let C be the challenger of GS.
• Initialization.. B receives the public parameter k ∈ N, a public key gpk, a
private opening key ok and a private issuing key ik from C. B simulates an
ASSO system by setting the tuple (gpk, ik, ok) as the TTP’s key tuple (tpk,
tik, tok). B initialises a number of users in the list LU by honestly running
Join and Iss algorithms. During this process, B obtains LU and reg. Now, B
sends (k, tpk, LU ) to A, and then runs sub-routine A as follows.
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• Corrupt TTP Oracle: If A queries the corrupt TTP oracle, B sends the private
issuer key tik, the private opening key tok and the registration table reg to
A.
• Corrupt User Oracle: If A queries the corrupt user oracle by sending an index
i,where Ui ∈ LU , B will retrieve regi from reg and obtain (gsk[i], usk[i]) from
challenger C by asking U SK(i) oracle. Then, B sends the private key uski and
the credential Crei = (regi , ski ) of Ui to A, where uski = usk[i], regi = regi ,
and ski = gsk[i]. The corrupted user list LCU , assumed initially empty, will
be updated by LCU = LCU ∪ {Ui }.
• Generate User Proof Oracle: If A queries the generate user proof oracle by a
message mi and a user ID Ui , where Ui ∈ LU , B̧ redirects this query to oracle
Gsig(i, mi ) which is provided by C. After obtaining σi ← GSig(gsk[i], mi ), by
setting upi = σi B sends upi w.r.t (mi , Ui ) to A. The generated user proof list
LU G , assumed initially empty, is then updated by LU P = LU P ∪ {mi , Ui , upi }.
Finally, A will output a message m∗ and a user proof up∗ . If A can break the
non-frameability of our generic ASSO construction, with non-negligible probability
(m∗ , up∗ ) should be valid and it will be traced to a user U ∗ , where U ∗ ∈ LU \LCU ∧
(m∗ , U ∗ , ∗) ∈
/ LU P . So, B can trivially set σ ∗ = up∗ and output its forgery (m∗ , σ ∗ )
to break the non-frameability of the dynamic group signature scheme GS used in
our ASSO. According to the definition given in Section 4.2.2, it is not difficult to
see that attacker B breaks the non-frameability of the underlying group signature
GS with the same non-negligible probability in polynomial time.
Hence, the ASSO scheme proposed above is non-frameable if the dynamic group
signature scheme GS used in our construction is non-frameable.
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Summary and Future Work

In this chapter, we proposed the first formal model to capture an anonymous single sign-on (ASSO). In this model, a user is anonymous and trust level in the
TTP is reduced, compared to existing SSO solutions. We also demonstrated how
any dynamic group signature scheme, which follows Bellare et al.’s model, can be straightforwardly transformed to an ASSO. We also proved the security of this generic
transformation based on the security of the underlying group signature. This formally confirms the relationship between a cryptographic primitive and a security
application. Namely, group signatures are a strong enough tool to implement ASSO
and ASSO forms a good potential application of group signatures.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this chapter, we will give a conclusion of our research and outline the future
work of our research. In this thesis, we have formalised the notions of single signon and anonymous single sign-on. Subsequently, we have constructed generic SSO
schemes from digital signatures and prove that our schemes are secure provided the
underlying signatures are secure.
• In chapter 3, we have formalised a security model of single sign-on scheme
and implemented a generic SSO by using any secure nominative signature
scheme. In our model, an SP is not required to communicate with the TTP
when it verifies the credential; an illegal person cannot access the SPs even
though he/she obtains a user’s valid credential; the soundness is satisfied and
furthermore, the trust dependence in the TTP is reduced. Moreover, a concrete instantiation of our scheme and a formal security proof have also been
proposed.
• In chapter 4, we have proposed the first formal model to capture an anonymous
single sign-on (ASSO). In this model, a user is anonymous and trust level
in the TTP is reduced, compared to existing SSO solutions. We have also
demonstrated how any dynamic group signature scheme, which follows Bellare
et al.’s model, can be straightforwardly transformed to an ASSO. We have also
proved the security of this generic transformation based on the security of the
81
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underlying group signature. This formally confirms the relationship between a
cryptographic primitive and a security application. Namely, group signatures
are a strong enough tool to implement ASSO and ASSO forms a good potential
application of group signatures. Moreover, a concrete instantiation of our
scheme has also been proposed.

5.1

Future Work

The issues may be considered in future are outlines as below:
• In the SSO model which proposed in chapter 3, the content of credential
is public, which is secure because others cannot impersonate a user without
the user’s private key. However, some users may even consider that their
credentials should be private and they do not want others to obtain their
credentials. So future work can consider how to protect the credential privacy
with efficiency and low trust level in the TTP.
• For our future work, several areas can be investigated. Firstly, new ASSO
solutions could be constructed from primitives other than group signatures.
Secondly, mutual authentication and/or key agreement could be introduced
into ASSO as existing solutions for SSO given in [67, 70]. Finally, the implementation of fine-grained access control can be considered. In practical
applications, an organisation may have a number of sub-groups of users. To
distinguish the access rights of each sub-group, one simple idea is to introduce
different TTP for each subgroup in our ASSO. Alternatively, we could use a
single TTP but have it set up multiple public group keys, each for specific
sub-group. To realise fine-grained access further, attributed base group signature (AGBS) [18, 19, 20] may serve an approprivate primitive to address
this problem. In AGBS, each verifier has an attributed tree and each group
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member has a list of properties. Only if the group member satisfies the requirements of the service, then he can sign a message. So, this looks a feasible
and interesting way to support fine-grained access in ASSO. However, current
AGBS as well as attributed based signatures are not very efficient.
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